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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON CORPORATE LIQUIDITY,
FINANCIAL CRISIS, AND REAL ESTATE
Kimberly Fowler Luchtenberg 
Old Dominion University, 2013 
Co-Directors: Dr. John Doukas 
Dr. Michael Seiler
The first essay examines why firms with access to lines of credit (LOC) have 
different drawdowns and their implications for asset pricing, investment and profitability. 
Utilizing a hand-collected LOC dataset that extends the sample of Sufi (2009) to 2010, 
our principal finding is that firms with greater LOC usage are more financially 
constrained than firms with lower LOC usage. We also document that high users o f  credit 
lines have higher risk-adjusted returns, less investment in capital expenditures and 
employment, and lower profitability than low LOC users. An interesting implication o f 
our evidence is that high LOC drawdowns could serve as an alternative financial 
constraint measure.
The second essay shows that firms are unable to utilize credit lines to prevent 
decreases in investment during the 2008 financial crisis. Theory predicts that credit lines 
provide liquidity insurance that allows firms to invest during periods o f limited credit 
availability; however, we do not find evidence in support o f the theoretical predictions.
To the contrary, we find strong evidence that credit lines do not enable firms to maintain 
investment during the crisis. With a unique dataset that includes bank line o f credit 
drawdowns and hedging data, we study the relationship between credit line usage and
corporate investment. Our results suggest that credit lines may be unable to provide 
adequate liquidity insurance to allow firms to continue investment during tough 
economic environments.
In the third essay, we examine linkages between the real estate and stock markets 
before and after the delisting o f Lehman Brothers to determine if the 2008 financial crisis 
had an effect on the degree of integration between these two markets. Using several 
different models, we find that real estate returns subsequently influence stock market 
returns, a unique result when compared to past financial crises, but consistent with recent 
findings o f  increased systematic risk in REITs. These tests were made possible through 
the employment o f a new daily transaction-based commercial real estate return series.
This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my grandmother, Professor 
Blanche Raiford, who showed me the love o f life-long learning.
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1CHAPTER I
BANK LINES OF CREDIT AND DRAWDOWNS
INTRODUCTION
The subject o f credit lines has received increasing attention in the corporate 
finance literature since Sufi's (2009) seminal work. The previous literature concentrates 
on whether or not a firm has access to lines o f credit (LOC) and whether they possess 
liquidity insurance properties. Sufi (2009) also argues that lack of access to a line o f 
credit could be a more powerful measure o f financial constraints than traditional 
measures used in the literature.1 While these studies are insightful about the role o f LOC 
in corporate finance, when firms with access to LOCs realize the benefits o f  liquidity 
insurance remains unknown. The reason is that previous studies simply assume that 
access to lines o f credit automatically yields liquidity insurance benefits. We argue that 
the liquidity insurance function o f lines o f credit can be assessed by focusing on LOC 
drawdowns. Moreover, studying the usage o f lines o f credit is expected to allow us to 
gain insights into the financial status o f  firms with access to lines o f  credit.2 This paper 
sheds light on these issues by addressing the question: why do some firms with access to 
lines o f credit use them more extensively than others? The answer to this important 
question is expected to let us know when the liquidity insurance function o f  credit lines is 
performed effectively.
1 See, Sufi (2009), Yun (2009), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Almeida, Campello and Hackbarth (2011), 
and Campello, Giambona, Graham and Harvey (2011). The key variable in most o f  these studies is the 
extent to which firms use lines o f  credit as a percentage o f  the firm’s total liquidity, measured as lines o f  
credit divided by lines o f  credit plus cash.
2 Using survey data. Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) report that financially constrained firms 
planned to use more LOCs and cash during the 2008 financial crisis than firms that were more financially 
healthy.
2Several theoretical studies suggest that lines o f credit are used as a hedge against a 
possible reduction in availability o f future funds (Campbell (1978), Hawkins (1982), 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998)). Shockley and Thakor (1997) argue that LOCs may be 
used as liquidity insurance to protect a firm 's ability to invest during states o f  the 
economy when credit is difficult to obtain. Likewise, anecdotal reports from the CFO 
magazine3 state that firms increase LOCs before investment, possibly indicating that they 
are used as a hedge against an increase in interest rates. Additionally, several recent 
survey-based and empirical studies have found that a firm 's access to credit lines may 
increase investment. By interviewing CFOs regarding investment plans and line o f credit 
usage for future investment, Campello, Giambona. Graham and Harvey (2011) find that 
access to LOCs may allow firms to increase investment to levels higher than what could 
have been achieved with cash alone. Specifically, they find that firms that are more 
reliant on credit lines for liquidity are able to engage in more investment than firms that 
rely more heavily on cash. Almeida, Campello and Hackbarth (2011) provide further 
eOvidence that the existence o f LOCs can boost a Finn’s investment activities. 
Furthermore, they find that use o f credit lines is more prevalent in industries in which 
liquidity-seeking mergers take place. It is important to note that these studies focus 
primarily on the proportion of coiporate liquidity that is satisfied by either LOCs or cash. 
That is, they study credit lines and cash as complementary or substitute corporate 
liquidity components. Taken together, these studies confirm that credit lines can be a 
form of liquidity insurance that enables firms to engage in investment activities.
However, in order for credit lines to provide effective liquidity insurance, 
sufficient unused credit must be available. A near fully-used credit line does not provide
3 See June 2008 issue o f  CFO magazine.
3a firm with the ability to receive additional liquidity and therefore cannot be used as a 
hedge. Firms that choose to draw down their credit lines extensively may forfeit the 
liquidity insurance benefit of credit lines. Therefore, we hypothesize that only firms that 
have used a low percentage o f their credit lines are employing credit lines as liquidity 
insurance.
Liquidity insurance may be one reason firms pursue access to LOCs. However, 
there may be other reasons LOCs are utilized. Some firms may use their credit lines to 
meet day to day liquidity requirements, including investment. Sufi (2009) finds that 
LOCs may be more useful to firms with high cash flow due to debt covenants. Debt 
covenants often require that firms maintain high performance in order to retain access to 
credit lines. However, among firms that have credit lines, those that have relatively low 
levels o f  cash flow and little access to capital markets may be expected to make greater 
use o f their credit lines than more financially robust firms. There is some non-US 
evidence that supports this supposition. In a sample o f Spanish firms, Jimenez, Lopez and 
Saurina (2009) argue that whether or not a firm is able to meet its debt obligations 
influences credit line usage. They find firms that are unable to make timely payments use 
a higher percentage o f their credit lines. Similarly, Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito and Perez 
(2012) find that firms with high hedging needs use less of their credit lines. That is, firms 
with a lower correlation between cash flow and investment have more undrawn lines o f 
credit.
Given these two competing uses o f credit lines (liquidity insurance and corporate 
investment) we propose that there are two different types o f firms, each having access to 
credit lines but choosing to use them differently: high LOC users and low LOC users.
4Firms that are high users extensively draw down their LOCs resulting in a high 
percentage o f the total available LOCs being used. Low LOC users make less use o f  their 
LOCs and therefore have a low percentage o f used LOCs. High users may have limited 
access to the capital markets because they possess high idiosyncratic risk. Hence, they 
use LOCs because of limited alternative credit options. Consequently, for this type o f  
firm, LOCs cannot be viewed as a credit hedge. In fact, these firms may be viewed as 
financially constrained. The less-risky low users have a lower need to deploy their lines 
o f credit because they have more access to capital markets and lower financing costs. 
These firms may be viewed as buying liquidity insurance against a future liquidity or 
credit squeeze that may have an adverse effect on their investment or operating cash flow 
needs. That is, they are using LOCs as a hedge.
Furthermore, to the extent that the financial constraint argument is true, LOC 
usage should be priced in the cross section o f returns. Since financially constrained firms 
have higher returns than non-financially constrained firms (Whited and Wu (2006), 
Livdan, Sapriza and Zhang (2009)), we expect that high LOC users will command a 
higher return than low LOC users. That is, investors are expected to perceive high-users 
o f lines o f credit as more risky than firms that make less use o f their LOCs. Accordingly, 
we conjecture that investors will demand higher returns in order to hold equity shares o f 
high LOC firms.
These arguments are based on extant theoretical literature. Although Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) argue that in efficient markets, capital structure does not influence a 
firm’s ability to invest; more recent research demonstrates that in the presence o f market 
frictions, capital structure may have an impact on a firm’s investment decisions and
operating performance. Several studies suggest that increased leverage is associated with 
lower levels o f  investment (Myers (1977), Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996)). Almeida and 
Campello (2007) propose and test a theory that market frictions influence corporate 
investment. Furthermore, Hahn and Lee (2009) extend the Almeida and Campello (2007) 
model and find that the risk o f not having sufficient funds for investment is priced in the 
cross-section o f returns for financially constrained firms. Taken together, these studies 
imply that in the presence o f market frictions, access to additional financing (or the risk 
associated with the lack o f additional funding) influences both investment and the cross- 
section o f returns. Since constrained firms have fewer options and are more reliant on 
LOCs, we expect that constrained firms use them more extensively. Hence, using LOC 
usage as an indication o f a firm’s access to additional funds, we empirically examine 
whether or not the theoretical prediction that high LOCs users are constrained is 
confirmed in the data.
To address these issues, we begin by creating a dataset that builds upon line o f 
credit information from Amir Sufi’s 2009 study, which he generously made available on 
his website. However, his data only covers the time period o f  1996-2003. Since we want 
to ensure that our results encompass the effects o f the 2008 financial crisis, we hand- 
collected additional LOC data from firm 10-Ks, extending the dataset to 2010. We 
completed the unique dataset by combining the 1997-2010 LOC data with returns and 
other corporate financial data from CRSP and Compustat.4 The longer time series of 
information allows us to examine LOC usage over periods o f  both stable and tumultuous 
credit markets, providing a more accurate understanding o f the ways LOCs are used.
4 Due to computational requirements to produce risk-adjusted returns, this portion o f  our study begins with 
1997 data.
6While previous studies examine LOCs as a percentage of total liquidity, our key 
measure is an indicator variable that reflects whether or not a firm is a high LOC user.
We limit our study to firms with access to LOCs to tease out the information provided by 
the extent of LOC usage, rather than merely access to LOCs. We then divide the data into 
two sub-samples: firms that have a high percentage (above the sample median) o f used 
lines o f credit and those that have a low percentage (below the sample median) o f used 
lines o f credit. The splitting o f the sample allows us to examine differences in the high 
and low users. We then create three different indicator variables, reflecting alternative 
measures o f high/low users to ensure that our results are robust. Each indicator variable 
takes the value o f  1 if a firm is classified as a high LOC user and 0 otherwise.
With this unique dataset we are able to investigate differences in LOC usage. We 
find strong support for our hypothesis that there are significant differences between firms 
that use a high percentage of their credit lines (high users) and those that do not (low 
users). Not only do high users have more book leverage and less liquidity than low users, 
but they also have lower bond ratings and less access to commercial paper. These 
differences provide early evidence that high LOC users may be financially constrained 
and support our later findings that firms that use their credit lines more have higher risk- 
adjusted returns, less corporate investment and lower profitability than low LOC users.
We begin by examining Sufi’s results over time. His main finding is that cash 
flow is a crucial determinant in a firm’s decision to use cash or credit lines to satisfy 
liquidity requirements. After extending the dataset to 2010, we confirm Sufi’s results. We 
find that cash flow remains an important indicator o f  a firm’s liquidity choice and that 
firms with higher cash flow volatility prefer to use cash for liquidity. Our results also
7indicate that credit line usage plays a role in firms' liquidity choice. When we add credit 
line usage to Sufi’s regression specification, we find that in addition to cash flow, credit 
line usage is a significant factor in a firm’s liquidity choice. Credit line usage is 
significant in a firm 's liquidity choice, even after controlling for cash flow hedging.
These findings suggest that credit line drawdown warrants further investigation.
We subsequently examine whether high and low LOC users are subject to 
different financial constraints. To address this issue we utilize existing measures from the 
previous literature (Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
(1988), Whited (1992), Kashyap and Lamont (1994), Calomiris, Himmelberg and 
Wachtel (1995), Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004), Hahn and Lee (2009)) and 
find that high LOC users have less access to capital markets than low LOC users. In 
particular, high LOC users are less likely to have a bond rating and access to commercial 
paper.
Next, we examine the relationship between LOC usage and the cross section o f 
returns. Using monthly data combined with CRSP, we regress a high LOC indicator 
variable against risk- adjusted returns. We find that high LOC users have higher risk- 
adjusted returns than low LOC users. We verify that this result is not sensitive to the 
definition o f high/low users by investigating alternate classification schemes. We also 
confirm that the relationship between LOC usage and return is robust to other measures 
o f risk by controlling for common measures o f financial constraints and market 
movements. These results are consistent with the idea that high LOC users are more 
financially constrained and, therefore, why investors require a higher return to hold these 
firms.
8Finally, we examine the differences in the level o f corporate investment and 
degree o f profitability in high and low LOC users. If high users face greater difficulty in 
accessing capital markets, they are expected to be less able to engage in corporate 
investment activities and have lower levels o f accounting profitability. Our results 
support this supposition. Specifically, we find that high users have lower levels o f  capital 
expenditures and employment than low LOC users. High users also have lower 
profitability as measured by ROA, EBITDA (sealed by total assets), and ROE.
This current paper adds to the literature in several important ways. First, our 
empirical evidence shows that even among firms with access to LOCs, the different 
levels o f LOC usage indicate that firms operate under different levels o f  financial 
constraints. Firms that use a high (low) percentage o f their LOCs are more (less) 
financially constrained. Second, by adding seven additional years o f data, we are able to 
confirm Sufi’s main result that cash flow is an important determinant o f a firm ’s liquidity 
choice. We also find evidence that LOC usage influences a firm ’s choice to use cash or 
bank lines o f credit for liquidity. Third, this paper documents the previously unexplored 
relationship between the cross section o f returns and LOCs. Reflecting their level o f 
financial constraint, firms exhibiting high usage o f LOCs have higher risk-adjusted 
returns than firms with low LOC usage. Investors demand higher returns to compensate 
for the higher levels o f risk. Finally, we find evidence suggesting that high usage o f 
LOCs reduces the ability o f the firm to engage in corporate investment, specifically 
capital expenditure and employment. High users employ LOCs to cover cash flow and 
short term operating requirements. They do not benefit from the investment-increasing 
liquidity insurance that credit lines offer to low LOC users. Altogether, our results
9provide strong and consistent evidence that a firm ’s choice o f credit line usage reflects its 
level o f financial constraint.
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theoretical Basis fo r  Hypothesis
Our main hypothesis addresses the question of why firms with access to lines of 
credit have different drawdowns. Since LOCs are debt instruments, we look to the theory 
o f capital structure for guidance in understanding how firms use credit lines. The 
literature addresses capital structure implications for both returns and investment.
We first address the cross-section o f returns. In their seminal paper, Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) find that in a world with perfectly efficient markets, capital structure of 
the firm should have no impact on returns. However, allowing for market frictions,
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that credit rationing can occur in equilibrium with bank 
lending. Welch (2004) finds that capital structure changes (proxied by the debt ratio) are 
primarily influenced by changes in the value o f equity due to market performance. Hahn 
and Lee (2009) provide further evidence o f the effect o f capital structure on the cross 
sectional returns o f constrained firms. By examining manufacturing firms from 1973 to 
2001, they find that debt capacity is a predictor o f  cross-sectional returns only in firms 
that are financially constrained. Financial constraints are modeled in four different ways: 
Asset size, payout ratio, bond rating, and commercial paper rating. This finding shows 
that in the presence o f market imperfections, higher debt capacity is associated with 
higher returns. However, such a relationship only exists in financially constrained firms. 
That is, the higher debt capacity provides a higher level o f exposure to risks o f  changes in
10
interest rates or a reduced availability o f funds required for future investment. They find 
that this risk is indeed priced in the market. Debt capacity predicts cross-sectional returns, 
but only in financially constrained firms, as theory conjectures. Because High LOC users 
have little access to additional liquidity, they should be associated with higher returns in 
the cross-section than Low LOC users since investors view them as riskier due to lack of 
access to credit for investment not having sufficient slack to mitigate the risk o f default 
due to fluctuations in cash flows.
Next, we turn to the theoretical literature that examines the relationship between 
debt and investment. Once again when market frictions like agency costs and information 
asymmetries are introduced to the perfect markets o f  Modigliani and Miller (1958), 
studies have shown that capital structure changes may impact investment. Managers may 
under-invest in an effort to shift wealth to shareholders (Myers (1977). These managers 
may choose to pay dividends rather than invest in positive net present value projects. 
Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996) find that leverage is negatively related to investment, but 
only in low Q firms. They find that in the presence o f increased leverage, corporate 
investment is not reduced in well-managed (high Q) firms. Bradley, Jarrell and Kim 
(1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988) also document a negative relationship between 
leverage and investment in research and development (R&D). Specifically, a lower debt 
ratio leads to higher R&D expenditures. In a more recent paper, Almeida and Campello 
(2007) propose a theory that access to additional financing can increase investment in 
constrained firms. Their empirical tests provide evidence suggesting that financial 
constraints do affect corporate investment.
11
Taken together, the literature suggests that debt, including credit lines, is more 
likely to be used by financially constrained firms because they have fewer alternative 
funding options. If LOC usage reflects a firm ’s level o f financial constraints, then high 
LOC users should have a similar relationship to the cross-section o f returns and 
investment as other constrained firms. Specifically, they should be associated with higher 
returns and less corporate investment then less constrained firms such as low LOC users.
Previous LOC Literature
The use o f  credit lines as liquidity insurance is richly documented in the 
theoretical literature (Campbell (1978), Hawkins (1982). Shockley and Thakor (1997), 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998)). Firms may use credit lines as a cost effective way to 
ensure liquidity is available in the event that cash or other forms o f financing are not 
readily available. DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) create a model that examines the 
heterogeneity o f debt. They develop the terms of optimal contracts for long-term debt, 
credit lines, and equity and argue that credit lines may be used to provide the firm 
sufficient slack so that it is not at risk o f default due to fluctuations in cash flows. That is, 
lines o f credit can also be used as insurance against the possibility o f a decrease in cash 
flows. A common feature in all these studies is that they treat credit lines as a 
dichotomous variable: either firms have access to credit lines or they do not. In reality, 
firms with access to credit lines may not have limited or very little access to additional 
liquidity if they have experienced high drawdowns. That is, if  a firm uses a high 
percentage o f its credit lines, its access to additional liquidity via credit lines is 
diminished because it has already employed the majority o f its credit lines.
12
The liquidity literature has recently seen a surge in papers examining credit lines. 
Most o f these studies focus on a firm’s choice o f credit lines or cash to meet liquidity 
requirements. The first comprehensive empirical study o f LOC was conducted by Sufi 
(2009) in which he found that LOCs are useful only to firms with positive cash flow. 
Specifically, his findings indicate that firms with low cash flow are unable to use LOCs 
due to restrictive loan covenants. However, his results do not shed light on the question 
why some firms with access to credit lines make greater usage of LOCs than others.
Sufi’s evidence suggests that firms that are unable to use LOCs may have exhausted their 
LOCs, which warrants a formal investigation.
Since Sufi (2009). there have been several other empirical studies concerning the 
role o f lines o f credit. For example, Yun (2009) examines the relationship between credit 
lines and corporate governance. He finds that firms with poor corporate governance 
prefer to use credit lines for liquidity than cash. He suggests that using credit lines 
reduces the prospect o f opportunistic managers squander cash. Almeida, Campello and 
Hackbarth (2011) find that credit lines are used to finance liquidity mergers, or 
acquisitions undertaken in an effort to increase bidder’s liquidity. Lins, Servaes and 
Tufano (2010) survey international CFOs to examine whether or not cash and credit lines 
are used for the same purpose. They find evidence suggesting that credit lines are used to 
facilitate corporate investment in positive economic times, but that firms rely more on 
cash during hard times. This is a novel finding suggesting that credit lines may be used 
for purposes other than liquidity insurance. Continuing in this line o f research, Campello, 
Giambona, Graham and Harv ey (2011) investigate whether access to lines o f  credit 
influenced planned investment during the recent financial crisis. Using survey data from
13
2008-2009. they find that credit lines can allow firms to increase investment over what 
they could have achieved with cash alone, but that the existence o f credit lines, by itself, 
does not increase investment during a crisis. Whereas these papers examine the firm 's 
choice o f liquidity (cash versus credit lines), this current paper looks into the degree to 
which firms use credit lines and the whether LOC usage lessens financial constraints.
Two recent papers are more related to this article in that they address different 
uses o f credit lines: Acharya, Almeida. Ippolito and Perez (2012) and Jimenez, Lopez and 
Saurina (2009). The first paper, Acharya. Almeida, Ippolito and Perez (2012), puts forth a 
theory in which credit lines are a monitored source o f  liquidity insurance. Like Sufi 
(2009), they argue that banks have the ability to control firm behavior through the use of 
credit line covenants. As in previous studies, they examine the choice o f  cash or credit 
lines for liquidity, using the credit lines as a percentage o f total liquidity measure. They 
find that firms with greater liquidity risk are more likely to use cash for liquidity 
requirements in order to avoid the high monitoring costs that using credit lines entails. 
Firms with lower liquidity risk are more likely to use credit lines because they incur 
lower monitoring costs. This paper provides important evidence pertaining to this current 
study because it provides the first model to allow for different purposes for credit lines. 
Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito and Perez (2012) suggest that credit lines are used not only to 
help firms during times o f limited liquidity, but also to make investments that support 
their future growth. Although their paper focuses on the liquidity choice rather than 
extent o f use, their model provides theoretical support for recognizing different uses o f 
credit lines as we do in this current paper. The second study, Jimenez, Lopez and Saurina 
(2009), investigates credit line usage in Spain. This paper is unique among the extant
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literature because it examines the percentage o f credit lines that are used, instead o f a 
firm 's choice o f cash or credit for liquidity. Using Spanish banking data from 1984 to 
2005, they find that firms that fail to meet required debt payments use more o f the credit 
lines than firms that never miss a payment. They also find that smaller, less profitable 
firms also use a higher percentage o f their credit lines. These findings are consistent with 
our hypothesis that credit line usage is indicative o f  a firm’s level o f financial constraints, 
but they do not address that firms may be using credit lines for different reasons. Neither 
Acharya. Almeida, Ippolito and Perez (2012) nor Jimenez, Lopez and Saurina (2009) 
addresses the differences between high LOC users and low LOC users; specifically that 
high LOC users may be financially constrained. They also do not examine the 
relationship between credit line drawdowns and the cross section o f returns, corporate 
investment and profitability5.
DATA
We construct our unique dataset spanning the 1997-2010 period using Sufi 
(2009)’s random sample o f  300 firms. Firm-year data concerning the amount o f credit 
lines used and total credit lines from 1997-2003 were obtained from Sufi’s website6. 
Following the procedures outlined in Sufi (2009), we then hand-collected used and total 
credit line data from the sample firms’ annual reports for 2004-2010. This drawdown 
information required to evaluate high and low credit line users is not available in the 
LPC-DealScan dataset (Almeida, Campello and Hackbarth (2011)). Since we are
5 See Demiroglu, C„ and C. James. 20 H , The use o f  bank lines o f  credit in corporate liquidity 
management: A review o f  empirical evidence, Journal o f  Banking & Finance 35, 775-782. for more review  
on the LOC literature.
6 http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/amir.sufi/data.htm
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interested in the different uses o f credit lines, the final sample includes only firms that 
had access to credit lines at some point during the period 1997-2010. We then combined 
this data with firm accounting data from Compustat. In order to examine the relationship 
between credit line usage and the cross section o f returns, we next add returns from 
CRSP to the dataset. Suffis data includes 255 firms with access to credit lines. Because 
we extended the sample to 2010, more firms obtained access to credit lines. Therefore, 
our initial sample includes 270 firms. We use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) two stage 
method to determine if firms that make great use o f  their credit lines and those that do not 
use their credit lines have different returns in the cross section. Following Hahn and Lee 
(2009), we address the errors-in-variables problem by using the Brennan, Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam (1998), method of substituting risk-adjusted returns for simple returns as 
the dependent variable. First, we estimate the factor loadings on the Fama-French 3- 
factor model for the 60-month period o f 1992-1996 using the following equation:
rjt = otj + /?i jM R P t + p 2 j S M B t + (33jH M L t +r]t (1)
The monthly factors are retrieved from the Kenneth French data library.7 MRP is the 
market risk premium, SMB is the small stock premium, and HML is the value stock 
premium. The monthly return is denoted by r.
Next, we construct the risk-adjusted returns as described below:
rjt =  rjt -  rf t  -  P-ljMRPt -  p 2jSM Bt -  0 3jHMLt (2)
7 http: 7mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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The risk-adjusted return, r*t. is the excess return (the monthly return, rj t , minus the risk­
free return, rf t , the one month Treasury bill also from the French website), minus the 
factor loadings from the previous equation multiplied by the factors in the current sample. 
The risk-adjusted returns are calculated for the period 1997-2010. Finally, the risk- 
adjusted returns are combined with the accounting data by CUSIP to complete the dataset 
formation process. We also conduct our analysis using risk-adjusted returns from the 1- 
factor Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
Our main study variable is a dichotomous measure indicating whether or not a 
firm uses a high percentage o f its credit lines. To avoid reliance on one definition o f high
Q f  ^
and low users, three methods are computed . LOG used ratio is defined as LOC 
Used/Total LOC. In other words, LOC used ratio is the ratio o f drawn credit lines to total 
credit. Our first categorization o f credit line usage is that high (low) LOC users are firms 
with LOC used ratio higher (lower) than the sample median (0.076). Therefore, the 
HiLOC indicator variable takes the value o f 1 if a firm has a LOC Used ratio higher than 
the sample median. Since credit line data was retrieved from annual reports, this data 
series is computed annually. Our second categorization, FliLOC2, defines high (low) 
users as those firms in the top (bottom) 30% o f the sample. The third categorization, 
HiLOC3, defines high (low) users as those firms in the top (bottom) 30% o f credit line 
usage by year.
METHODOLOGY
Before commencing with our study concerning credit line usage, we revisit Sufi 
(2009) main results for two reasons. First, we endeavor to determine whether his central 
8 We thank Dr. Licheng Sun for this suggestion.
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conclusion, that credit lines are more valuable to firms with high cash flow, remains 
intact after the addition o f seven years o f data. Second, we are interested to confirm 
whether treating high and low users separately provides additional explanatory power for 
a firm 's liquidity choice, controlling for the variables in his model. To perform this 
analysis, the variables from his Table 3 are included. Equation (3) describes the model 
specification.
/  T o ta l  LOC \  _
\ T o t a l  LOC+Cash) t
P0 + ^CashFlow^x  + p 2AssetTangibili tyt_1 +  p 3NonCash Asse ts t_x +  
P^ N etW or th^  + /?5MTBt^  + p 6CFVolt- 1 + p 7Not in S&P lndext -^i + p 80TCt^1 +  
p  LAget_1 + rjt 
(3 )
The dependent variable in all models is the percentage that credit lines, Total LOC , 
constitute of total liquidity, Total LOC + Cash. As in Sufi (2009), cash flow is calculated 
as EBITDA—. Sufi finds that cash flow is positively related to the percentage that credit
A sse ts-C a sh  r
lines are used o f total liquidity when the complete sample o f  firms (with and without 
access to credit lines) is utilized. However, this result is less robust for firms with access 
to credit lines. For firms with a credit line, he does not find a relationship between cash 
flow and credit lines as a percentage o f liquidity for one o f his two credit line measures. 
Theory suggests that this result may reflect the concept that cash flow is more important 
for more financially constrained firms (Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004)).
The remaining variables are expected to have the same relationship with credit 
lines as a percentage o f total liquidity as in Sufi. NonCash Assets, calculated as
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L n(A ssets -  Cash), should have a positive relationship with the choice to use credit lines 
for liquidity. NetWorth, Market to book ratio (M TB), and Cash flow volatility (CFVol) 
are expected to be negatively related to credit lines as a percentage o f total liquidity. 
NetWorth is calculated as Assets- Cash- LiablllUes_ m j b  [s calculated as
A sse ts -C a sh
Assets—bv of Eqmty+Mv of Equity-cash^ £ f y Qi js standard deviation of the previous four annual
A sse ts -C a sh
changes in cash flow scaled by (Total Assets-Cash). We also include AssetTangibility, 
Tana~ — l s LAge, the natural logarithm of the number o f years since IPO, and dummy
Tota l  A ssets ^  c  J  J
variables indicating the firms’ inclusion in the S&P 500, S&P 400, or S&P 600 Index and 
over the counter trading status. All data have annual periodicities. We estimate the 
equation using OLS. T-statistics are calculated with heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. 
Industry and year indicator variables are also included.
LOC usage and financial constraints
We next examine our hypothesis that credit line usage is related to a firm’s level 
o f financial constraint by using several established financial constraint measures. 
Following the literature, (Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1988 ), Whited (1992), Kashyap and Lamont (1994), Calomiris, Himmelberg 
and Wachtel (1995), Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004), Hahn and Lee (2009)) we 
measure financial constraints with a firm’s bond rating, commercial paper status, 
dividend payment policy, and asset size.
To evaluate the different levels o f  financial constraint o f high and low users o f  
credit lines, we assign indicator variables to represent financial constraint according to 
each measure. The BondRate variable takes the value o f 1 if a firm has a bond rating and 
0 otherwise. CommPaper takes the value o f 1 if a firm has a commercial paper rating and
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0 otherwise. HighDivPay takes the value o f 1 if a firm 's dividend payout ratio is in the 
top 30% o f the sample by year and 0 if  the dividend payout is in the bottom 30% by year. 
HighAssets takes the value o f 1 if a firm 's assets in the top 30% o f the sample by year 
and 0 if  assets rank in the bottom 30% by year. We then compare the mean indicator 
variable values for high and low credit line users to determine if high and low users are 
subject to different level o f financial constraints. We expect that high LOC users will be 
more constrained than low LOC users, resulting in lower means for high users. The 
financial constraint difference between high and low users, are then tested for statistical 
significance using a T-test for all four classification schemes.
LOC usage and the cross-section o f  returns
The next step in our analysis examines the relationship between credit line usage 
and the cross section o f returns. If credit line usage reflects a firm’ s financially 
constrained status, then this should also be reflected in the cross section o f returns. Since 
financially constrained firms have been associated with higher returns (Whited and Wu 
(2006), Livdan, Sapriza and Zhang (2009)) we expect that high users o f  credit lines will 
have higher returns than low users.
We investigate this expectation by regressing the risk-adjusted returns obtained 
from Equation (2) on lagged credit line and accounting variables. Due to our requirement 
that both CRSP and Compustat data are available, our cross-sectional returns analysis 
includes 181 firms. Hahn and Lee (2010) suggest that although size and book to market 
(BTM) are included in the procedure to create risk-adjusted returns, it is prudent to 
include them in the final regression to allow for the possibility that these important
2 0
factors have some residual effect. Lagging the independent variables allows a causal 
relationship between the independent variables and the risk-adjusted return to be 
determined, and also controls for the endogeneity o f the corporate liquidity decision. The 
regression takes the following specification:
rt+1* = Y0 4- yxSizet + y 2BTMt + y3L0CTotalt + y4Crisist + y sHiL0Ct +
X yIndustryi -I- r]t (4)
where Size is the natural logarithm o f total assets, BTM  is the book to market ratio
, , . B ook Value o f  th e  F irm  „ , ~ . , . , , . .calculated a s -----------------  . Both firm size and book to market have been
T o ta l  S h a re s  x S h a re  P rice
demonstrated to be related to cross-section o f returns (Hahn and Lee 2010). The total 
number o f credit lines, LOCTotal, is included in the regression to allow us to distinguish 
the effects o f the total amount o f credit lines from the effects o f credit line usage. The 
HiLOC  term is an indicator variable that takes the value o f 1 if  a firm has a
LOCUsedRatio. L0C Used higher than the median and 0 otherwise. Ivashina and
LOCTotal &
Scharfstein (2010) find that the downturn of the credit market financial crisis began in 
2007. Accordingly, we use the Crisis indicator variable that takes the value o f 1 if a firm- 
year observation is in 2007 or 2008 and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies are determined by 
the Fama French 12-industry SIC codes. The final term, q t , is the residual.
For both 1- and 3-factor risk-adjusted returns, we utilize models for each o f  the 
three different definitions o f high credit line users (higher than median, top 30%, top 30% 
by year), resulting in six separate models. The models are estimated using separate OLS 
regressions and heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. Industry dummy variables are also 
employed. We expect that the coefficient o f the HiLOC  measure, y5, to be positive,
2 1
indicating that firms with high credit line drawdowns have higher returns in the cross 
section.
A robustness test
To evaluate if  the relationship between credit line usage and the cross section of 
returns is actually reflects the firm 's financial constraint or market cycles, we conduct 
similar analyses by adding different financial constraint and market cycle measures to the 
regression. Equation (5) specifies the model.
r t+i* =  yo + Y\Si? .et +  Y2 ^ T M t +  YzL O C T ota l t +  y4/ / tL 0 C t +  Y 5 C ris is t +  
y6Constraint o r M arkett+yIndus tryt'P rjt (5)
If HiLOC is a robust financial constraint measure, its coefficient will remain 
positive and significant, even after other financial constraint measures are added to the 
model.
We also include two more financial constraint measures {BondRate, CommPaper) 
and two market performance measures ( Up and Up3). BondRate and CommPaper are 
indicator variables that take the value o f 1 if a firm has a bond rating or access 
commercial paper, respectively, and 0 otherwise. The market cycle measures are from the 
Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI)9, which measure the rate o f  expansion of 
the economy. Up takes the value o f 1 for months when the market expands at a rate that 
exceeds the historical trend growth rate and 0 otherwise. UP3 takes the value o f 1 when 
the 3-month moving average o f the CFNAI exceeds the average and 0 otherwise. Since
9 The Chicago Fed National Activity Index data was retrieved from
http:/vvww.chicaaofed.or»'\ve bpa£es/research/data'cfnai-historical data.cfm
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firms with a bond rating (BondRate= 1) or access to commercial paper (CommPaper=  1) 
are not considered financially constrained, we expect a negative coefficient on these 
variables, signifying that constrained firms have higher returns in the cross section than 
unconstrained firms (Whited and Wu (2006), Livdan, Sapriza and Zhang (2009)).
LOC usage, investment and profitability
In addition to the relation between credit line usage and the cross section o f 
returns, our hypothesis, that credit line usage reflects a firm’s level o f  financial constraint, 
has predictions for corporate investment and profitability. If firms with greater use o f 
credit lines are financially constrained, then these high LOC users are expected to engage 
in less corporate investment activities and be less profitable.
To examine this line o f reasoning, we employ a methodology similar to that o f 
Campello, Giambona, Graham and Harvey (2011) and hypothesize that high LOC users 
(i.e. firms with a high percentage o f  credit lines used) have lower levels o f corporate 
investment than low LOC users. Since they are using credit lines for other purposes (i.e., 
address short term-financing needs probably due to low cash flows and limited access to 
capital markets), we conjecture that they will be unable to take advantage o f the 
investment-increasing effects o f LOCs’ liquidity insurance function. To address this 
prediction we modify the base-line specification o f Campello, Giambona, Graham and 
Harvey (2011) by including an indicator variable to account for high users o f  credit lines, 
as shown in Equation (6) below.
Investmentt+1 =  Yo + Y\Sizet + y 2Casht+  y3LOCTotalt + y4Cash * LOCTotalt + 
ysHiLOCt + r] (6)
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Since high users o f credit lines have little access to additional liquidity and are unable to 
exploit the liquidity insurance properties o f credit lines, they are expected to invest less 
than low LOC users. Consequently, the HiLOC  indicator variable should enter the 
regression with a negative coefficient. High users o f  credit lines have little access to 
additional liquidity and are unable to exploit the liquidity insurance properties o f credit 
lines, resulting in less investment than low users. As in the previous analysis, we define 
high users with three different measures to ensure our results are not driven by a specific 
measure o f high LOC usage. We also expect to confirm the result o f Campello, 
Giambona, Graham and Harvey (2011), who find that credit lines increase the ability of 
firms to invest above what they could have done with cash alone. Specifically, we expect 
a positive coefficient on both the LOCTotal and the interaction of LOCTotal and HiLOC. 
As in Campello, Giambona, Graham and Harvey (2011), we examine three different 
types o f corporate investment: capital expenditures (Capex), R&D. and employment 
(Empl). Industry dummies are also added to the specification to control for industry- 
specific variation in corporate investment.
Finally, we turn our focus to the profitability o f high and low users o f credit lines. 
To the extent that credit lines reflect whether firms are financially constrained, high LOC 
users will be less likely to engage in efficient corporate investment and therefore be less 
profitable. Hence, we expect high users o f  credit lines to have lower levels of 
profitability. To examine the impact o f LOC usage on profitability, we regress three 
profitability measures (ROA, EBITDA scaled by total assets, and ROE) against 
LOCTotal, HiLOC, and control variables, as listed in Equation (7), below.
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Prof i tab i l i ty t+1 = y 0 +  YiSizet + y2BTM+ Y2LOCTotalt +
Y4H i L 0 C t + rjt (7)
In our analysis we use ROA, EBITDA scaled by total assets, and ROE as profitability 
measures. Our regression specification is constructed to control for known determinants 
o f profitability. Joh (2003) finds that firm size, market to book, industry, and time can all 
impact firm profitability. Accordingly, we include the following control variables: Size 
(the natural logarithm of assets) and BTM, the book to market ratio. Industry dummy 
variables and year dummy variables are included to impose industry and year fixed 
effects.
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics
We first take a closer look at the sample by examining the descriptive statistics 
reported in Table 1 and defining additional variables used in this study. Panel A reports 
statistics for the entire 270-firm sample, while Panels B and C provide statistics for low 
and high users o f credit lines, respectively. When the sample is split in this manner some 
immediate differences between the two types o f firms are revealed. LOCTotal is the total 
amount o f lines o f credit, used and unused. LOC Used is the fraction o f used line o f credit 
and the LOCUsedRatio is L0C- -‘—. For the entire sample, in Panel A, the median firm used
LOCTotal r  ’
11 % of credit lines. But the differences between low and high users are striking. Low 
users (in Panel B) do not use their credit lines at all with 0% median LOCRatioUsed, 
while high users (in Panel C) use 47% o f their credit line availability. This significant
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LOC drawdown difference provides support for the supposition that the latter are using 
credit lines for different purposes.
It seems that firms with access to credit lines and low LOC drawdowns are more 
likely to use them as a hedging instrument against a liquidity shock (i.e., a safeguard 
against the inability to obtain financing when valuable opportunities arise) while firms 
with high LOC drawdowns use them to meet short term-financing needs probably
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (Total and by LOC Usage)
This table provides summary statistics for the variables used in this study after merging with monthly 
return data from CRSP. Data are from 270 sample firms from 1996-2010 that have access to lines o f  credit. 
1996-2003 data is from Amir Sufi's (2009) study. 2004-2010 data was hand collected for this study. 
Accounting data are from COM PUSTAT. Line o f  credit data are from Amir Sufi’s website (1996-2003) 
and firm 10-K reports (2004-2010). Assets is the firm’s total assets. MTB is the cash-adjusted book to
. . Book Value o f  E q u i t y •¥M arke t  Value o f  E q u i ty - C a s h  ^  ^ i / . \
market ra tio ,-------------------------------------------------------------------. Cash is the amount of cash (stock).N o n -C a s h  Total  Asse ts  v
Employment is the number o f  em ployees. Capex is the annual firm capital expenditures in plant, property, 
and equipment. R&D is the annual expenditure on research and development. LOCTotal is the total amount 
o f  lines o f  credit, used and unused. LOCUsed is the amount o f  used line o f  credit. LOCUsedRatio is
----------- . BookLeverage is book debt divided by total assets. Liquidity is liquid assets divided by total
assets. N is the number o f  observations. Panel A presents statistics for the full sample set. Panel B presents 
statistics for the sample subset o f  firms with LOC usage less than the median (HiLO C=0). Panel C presents 
statistics for the sample subset o f  firms with LOC usage greater than the median (H iL O C =l).
Panel A: All Firms
Variable Median Mean Minimum Maximum S td  D ev N
LOCTotal 52.66 287.39 0.100 14671.000 751.469 2418
LOCUsedRatio 0.11 0.26 0.000 1.000 0.310 2418
Assets 342.19 2823.50 0.246 227251.000 13702.591 2348
MTB 1.35 1.99 -0.640 89.589 2.950 2274
Cash 15.85 112.61 0.000 9782.000 438.872 2307
BookLeverage 0.48 0.5! 0.020 28.045 0.837 2330
Liquidity 0.50 0.49 0.027 0.982 0.230 2279
Employment 2.20 14.00 0.000 366.000 37.509 2326
Capex 14.14 199.42 0.000 17633.000 1170.752 2340
R&D 2.43 56.88 0.000 5273.000 352.718 1393
Panel B: Low LOC users
Variable M edian Mean Minimum Maximum S td  D ev N
LOCTotal 45.90 295.13 0.100 7940.000 774.308 1209
LOCUsedRatio 0.00 0.01 0.000 0.111 0.025 1209
Assets 351.96 4012.82 0.246 227251.000 18429.477 1167
MTB (Cash Adj) 1.54 2.27 -0.035 34.083 2.767 1132
Cash 31.73 175.23 0.000 9782.000 588.371 1149
BookLeverage 0.38 0.48 0.020 28.045 1.167 1152
Liquidity 0.55 0.53 0.037 0.982 0.222 1147
Employment 2.30 17.74 0.007 366.000 45.848 1160
Capex 15.24 301.12 0.000 17538.000 1558.819 1162
R&D 2.96 83.08 0.000 5273.000 468.553 759
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Panel C: High LOC users
Variable Median Mean Minimum Maximum S td  D ev N
LOCTotal 65.00 279.65 0.100 14671.000 728.151 1209
LOCU sedR atio 0.47 0.51 0.112 1.000 0.259 1209
Assets 328.81 1648.28 2.021 164735.000 5920.839 1181
MTB (Cash Adj) 1.23 1.70 -0.640 89.589 3.096 1142
Cash 6.23 50.48 0.000 2765.196 180.666 1158
BookLeverage 0.53 0.55 0.060 2.685 0.232 1178
Liquidity 0.46 0.44 0.027 0.960 0.229 1132
Employment 2.04 10.27 0.000 295.000 26.245 1166
Capex 12.34 99.11 0.000 17633.000 553.794 1178
R&D 1.65 25.52 0.000 1900.000 94.233 634
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because o f low cash flows and limited access to capital markets. In fact, we observe that 
low credit line users have significantly higher levels o f cash (175.2 versus 50.5) and 
liquidity (0.53 versus 0.44) than high credit line users. Furthermore, low LOC users are 
more than twice as large as the mean firm o f high LOC users (mean assets o f 4,013 for 
low users versus 1,648 for high users). Low usage firms also have a higher market to 
book ratio (MTB) than high LOC usage firms (2.27 versus 1.70) and lower levels o f  book 
leverage (0.48 versus 0.55).
Corporate investment follows a similar pattern. Low users have higher levels of 
investment in employment (Empl), capital expenditures {Capex) and research and 
development (R&D). All together, these univariate results appear to be consistent with 
our hypothesis that credit line usage mirror’s a firm ’s level o f  financial constraint. Like 
financially constrained firms, high users o f credit lines are smaller, have fewer growth 
opportunities, and less liquidity than their low user counterparts. They also engage in less 
corporate investment activities than firms that have access to credit lines, but use them 
less.
We now examine credit line usage by industry, using the Fama French 12 industry 
SIC codes from Kenneth French’s website, and report the results in Table 2. These results 
indicate that there is a large variation in total credit lines across industries. Business 
Equipment has the lowest mean number o f  credit lines (89.53) and Telephone and TV has 
the largest (1662.03). Similarly, the mean percentage o f LOCs used also varies by 
industry from a low o f 20% for Business Equipment to a high o f 44% for Energy. It is 
interesting to note that Energy, one of the industries that has the fewest credit lines, also 
uses them the most. The results o f this table suggest that industry differences are
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Table 2 LOC Usage by Industry
This table provides mean LOC usage by industry for sample firms. Data are from 270 sample firms from
1996-2010 that have access to lines o f  credit. 1996-2003 data is from Amir Sufi’s (2009) study. 2004-2010  
data was hand collected for this study. Accounting data are from COMPUSTAT. Industry categories are 
calculated using the Fama French 12 industry SIC codes. Line o f  credit data are from Amir Sufi’s website 
(1996-2003) and firm 10-K reports (2004-2010). LO CTotal is the total amount o f  lines o f  credit, used and 
unused. LO CU sedR atio  is UH:Vsed m n  js the number o f  observations.
LOCTotal
Industry
Mean
LO CTotal
Mean
LOCUsedRatio N
Non-Durables 120.49 0.33 183
Durables 659.55 0.21 67
M anufacturing 296.47 0.21 482
Energy 93.56 0.44 82
Chem icals 305.93 0.30 39
Business Equipment 89.53 0.20 339
Telephone and TV 1662.03 0.31 82
Utilities 356.42 0.34 65
Shops 278.39 0.24 452
Health 345.14 0.25 234
Other 177.52 0.32 393
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important in determining credit line usage. We therefore control for industry effects in 
our empirical analyses.
Determinants o f  liquidity choice
A key result o f Sufi (2009) is that cash flow is a main determinant o f  a firm ’s 
choice between cash and credit lines in corporate liquidity management. He argues that 
high cash flow firms are more able to use credit lines due to the restrictive covenants. 
However his results, based on the sample that only includes firms with access to credit 
lines, provide mixed support. Our results in Table 3 mirror this mixed finding on the 
importance o f cash flow. To aid in comparison, we report models 1 through 4 using only 
years included in Sufi’s analysis (1997-2003) as well as models 5 through 8 using entire 
sample (1997-2010). In Model 1. consistent with his results, cash flow is not significantly 
associated with the choice to use credit lines for liquidity. When we add the HiLOC 
indicator as an additional independent variable in Model 2, we find that LOC usage is 
important in a firm’s liquidity decisions.
High users are more likely to choose credit lines than cash. The coefficient o f 
HiLOC is 0.21 and significant at the 1% level. To further explore this result, we then add 
an interacted term o f HiLOC*CashFlow and find that CashFlow and LOC usage has a 
positive influence on the liquidity choice. The interacted variable in Model 2 is also 
significant at the 1% level, with a coefficient o f 0.29. These results also hold for the 
entire extended sample from 1996-2010.
Recent research suggests that a firm’s LOC hedging may influence its liquidity 
choices (Berrospide, Meisenzahl and Sullivan (2012)). To examine this assertion, we
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collect information from the firms' 10-K reports about whether or not the credit lines are 
hedged. We follow the procedure set forth in Berrospide, Meisenzahl and Sullivan (2012) 
to determine firms with hedged credit lines. Specifically, we download 10-K reports for 
the 1996-2010 time period for each firm that has access to credit lines and then use a 
search engine to find the words “interest rate agreement,” “interest rate agreements,” 
“interest rate exchange agreement,” “ interest rate exchange agreements,” “ interest rate 
hedge,” “interest rate hedges,” “interest rate swap,” or “interest rate swaps” within 1500 
characters o f words indicating credit line usage, “credit facility,” “credit facilities,”
“credit line,” “credit lines,” “line o f credit,” “lines o f  credit,” “loan facility,” “loan 
facilities,” “revolving facility,” “term loan,” and “term loans.” We then read the portions 
o f  the annual reports to examine if the firm explicitly states that it is hedging its revolving 
debt.
The binary variable hedge captures the results of this data collection process, 
which takes the value o f 1 if  a firm hedges its credit lines and 0 otherwise. In Models (4) 
and (8) we add the hedge variable to the specification to assess how hedging influences 
firms’ liquidity choices. For both models, the HiLOC variable is robust to adding the 
hedge indicator variable. During 1996-2003, hedging does not influence liquidity choice. 
However, for the entire sample, 1996-2010. the evidence shows that firms with hedged 
LOCs choose credit lines rather than cash for liquidity. While these findings support 
previous literature in that hedging has an impact on corporate liquidity, the LOC usage 
remains highly significant even after controlling for hedging behavior. Additionally, 
caution must be taken when interpreting these results concerning hedging, as the sample 
contained only 23 firms that reported hedging their credit lines.
Table 3. Determinants of Liquidity Choice
This model is based on Table 3 from Sufi (2009) The dependent variable is the percentage that credit lines constitute o f  total liquidity. Follow ing Sufi (2009), 
CashFlow  is calculated as —EB,TDA— AssetTangibility is 1—sA-sse-‘■ NonCashAssets is calculated as l,n(A ssets -  Cash). NetWorth is calculated as
A sse ts-C ash  Total  Assets
A sse ts -C a sh -L ia b i l i t ie s  . . . . .. , , . . ,  . . Book Value o f  E quity+M arket  Value o f  Equ ity -C ush  . . . . .  . . .  . . .
------------------------------. MTB is the cash-adiusted book to market ratio, . ( FVol, cashflow volatility, is the standard
Asse ts-C ash  N on-C ash  Total Assets
deviation o f  the previous four annual changes in cash flow scaled by (Total Assets-Cash). LAge is the natural logarithm o f  the number o f  years since IPO. 
Dummy variables indicating the firms’ inclusion in an S&P Index and over the counter trading status are also included. HiLOC  takes the value o f  I if  a firm has a 
LOCusedRatio higher than the median and 0 otherwise. Hedge takes the value o f  I if a firm reported that is hedging its LOCs and 0 otherwise. **. * are 
statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Panel A Dep. Var: Total Line/fTotal Line +■ Cash)
Sufi Sample (1996-2003) Full Sample {1996-2010)
(!) (2) O) (4) (5) (V (7) (H)
Intercept 0.84** 0.70** 0.70** 0 71** 0.73** 0 .66** 0 .68** 0 .66**
(8.78) (8.02) (8 .21) (8.19) (8.72) ( 10. 10) (10.46) (9.48)
CashFlow 0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.04 -0.02 -0.02
(0.32) (1.26) (-0.57) ( - 1.0 1 ) (0.08) (0.76) (-0.32) (-0.39)
AssetTangibility 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(0.38) (-0 .02) (-0.07) (-0.04) (0.23) (-0.15) (-0.26) (-0 .20)
NonCashAssets 0.02 0 .02* 0 .02* 0 .02*'“ 0 .02* 0 .02* 0 .02* 0 .02*
(1.79) (2.50) (2.53) (2 .68) (2.45) (2.62) (2.45) (2.35)
NetWorth -0 .21** -0 .1 1 * -0 . 10* -0 . 11* -0.07** -0.06** -0.06** -0.05**
(-3.83) (-2.23) (-2 .00) (-2.43) (-4.42) (-8.33) (-7.09) (-3.17)
MTB (Cash Adj) -0.02 -0 .02** -0 02** -0 .02** -0 .02* -0 .02** -0 .02** -0 0 2 **
(-1.95) (-4.45) (-4.59) (-4.64) (-2.73) (-6 .01) (-5.90) (-5 93)
CFVol -0.52** -0.33** -0.34** -0.35** -0.11 -0.05 -0.09 -0.08
(-3.85) (-2.69) (-3.16) (-3.44) (-1.28) (-0.65) ( - 1.02) (-0.75)
Not In S&P Index 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.00 0.00
(0.46) (-0.37) (-0.29) (-0.14) (0.78) (-0.19) (-0.07) (0.08)
o r e 0.02 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.04 0.0.3 0.03 0.03
(0.54) (-0 .00) (0.06) (-0.03) (0.96) (0.70) (0.76) (0.78)
LAge -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
(-0.92) (-0.90) (-0.97) (-0.98) (0.04) (0.55) (0.43) (0.51)
HiLOC 0 .21** 0.18** 0.17** 0 .20** 0.17** 0.17**
(9.53) (7.56) (7.04) (10.84) (8.27) (8.03)
HiL OC  * Cash FI ow 0.29** 0.31** 0.28** 0.27**
(3 45) (3.60) (3.91) (3.59)
Hedge 0.01 0.08**
(0.40) (2.77)
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations
1289 1121 1121 1098 2178 1997 1997 1951
R-squared 0.2304 0.3807 0.3925 0.4022 0.1826 0.3152 0.3256 0.3302
u>
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In all, the results in Table 3 are consistent with our suggestion that there are 
important differences between high and low users o f  credit lines. We would expect that 
cash flow would be very important in the liquidity choice o f high users o f  credit lines. 
Since we suspect high users are financially constrained, it makes sense that firms with 
relatively better cash flow would be able to use the credit lines. Cash flow-related 
covenants would influence lower cash flow firms to use cash instead o f credit lines. 
However, for the unconstrained low LOC users, cash flow covenants would have less 
influence on their choices. They intend to use the credit lines as liquidity insurance, rather 
than to meet investment or working capital needs.
LOCs and financial constraints
We next address our main contention, that corporate financial constraints influence 
bank credit line usage. Table 4 reports the mean values o f commonly used financial 
constraint measures for high and low LOC users. Bond rating, commercial paper, high 
dividends and high assets are reported in panels A, B, C. and D, respectively. In panel A, 
we find that high users o f credit lines are significantly less likely to have a bond rating 
than low users o f credit lines. Similarly, Panel B reports that high users are also less 
likely to have access to commercial paper than low users. Jointly these results are 
statistically significant at the 1% level advocating that high users are more financially 
constrained than low users. Panel D shows that high users have fewer assets than lowr 
users, although the difference is not statistically significant. Only Panel C seems to 
provide some evidence that high users are not constrained, although the result is not
Table 4. T-Tests For Different Financial Constraints
This table provides the statistical significance o f  the difference o f  the sample means o f  study variables for firms that are high LOC users (H iLO C =l) versus those 
that are not high LOC users (HiLOC=0). Data are from sample firms from 1997-2010 that have access to lines o f  credit. 1997-2003 data is from Amir Sufi's 
(2009) study. 2004-2010 data was hand collected for this study. Annual accounting data are from COMPUSTAT. The following four criteria are used for 
financial constraint: bond rating, commercial paper rating, dividend payout, and assets. HiLOC takes the value o f  1 if a firm has a LOCusedRatio higher than the 
median and 0 otherwise. Differences are calculated with four different measures o f  financial constraint. Bond rate takes the value o f  1 if the firm has a bond 
rating and 0 otherwise. Comm paper takes the value o f  1 if a firm has a commercial paper rating and 0 otherwise. High DivPay takes the value o f  1 if a firm’s 
dividend payout ratio is in the top 30% o f  the sample by year and 0 if the dividend payout is in the bottom 30% by year. High Assets takes the value o f  1 if  a 
firm’s assets in the top 30% o f  the sample by year and 0 if assets rank in the bottom 30% by year. Constrained firms are those with bond rating = 0, Comm Paper 
= 0, High DivPay=0, High Assets = 0; **, **, * are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Measure o f  Financial Constraint
A:Has Bond rating B.Has Comm Paper C: High DivPay D:High Assets
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean
Low LOC Users 835 0.3413 835 0.1341 209 0.5072 480 0.5313
High LOC Users 828 0.2826 828 0.0713 13! 0.5344 488 0.4816
Difference 0.0587*** 0.0629*** -0.0272 0.0497
T-stat (2.59) (4.25) (-0.49) (1.55)
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significant and there are very few observations included in the analysis since our sample 
does not contain very many firms that pay dividends. Overall, Table 4 provides evidence 
suggesting that high users are more financially constrained than low users o f  credit lines.
LOC usage and cross-section o f  returns
We now turn to examine the relation between credit line usage and the cross section 
o f stock returns using equation (4). Results from regressing risk-adjusted returns against 
the HiLOC  and total credit lines {LOCTotal), including controls for firm characteristics 
and an indicator variable for the financial crisis, are reported in Table 5. Panels A and B 
report regression results using 1- and the 3-factor risk-adjusted returns, respectively. Each 
panel also includes three models: one for each definition o f high users for a total o f six 
models in the entire table. The central result is the positive and statistically significant 
coefficients o f HiLOC, LULOC2 and HiLOC3 variables in all regressions. All three 
HiLOC  measures are positive and significant in both A and B Panels. In Panel A with 1- 
factor risk adjusted returns. HiLOC, HiLOC2, and HiLOC3 have coefficients o f 0.47, 
0.40, and 0.52, respectively. HiLOC  and HiLOC3 are significant at the 1% level, while 
HiLOC2 is significant at the 5% level. In Panel B with3-factor risk-adjusted returns, we 
also find that HiLOC is positive and statistically significant. Consistent with Whited and 
Wu (2006), who find that constrained firms have higher returns in the cross section, these 
results provide support for our assertion that firms that use a high percentage o f their 
credit lines are financially constrained.
In contrast, LOCTotal does not influence returns in most models in Panels A and 
B. Coefficients are not significantly different from zero for the HiLOC  and HiLOC3
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models, but are marginally negative in the models using HiLOC'2. The results for 
LOCTotal indicate that the amount credit lines per se do not reveal whether a firm is 
financially constrained.
The Crisis indicator variable is not significantly related to returns in the 1 -factor 
models, but is positively related to returns in the 3-factor models. This probably reflects 
the higher weight given to the market return factor in the 1 -factor models, when 
determining risk-adjusted returns. Any variation in returns due to the crisis may already 
be compensated for during the process o f  creating the risk-adjusted returns. Jointly, the 
results o f Table 5 suggest that firms with greater LOC usage are more financially 
constrained than firms with lower LOC usage.
It is possible that the previous results reflect missing variables. Hence, to address 
this issue we include in the analysis financial constraint variables to assess the 
importance o f HiLOC, HiLOC2 and HiLOCS variables. Specifically, we regress 3-factor 
risk-adjusted returns on the same variables listed in the previous section, but we add a 
constraint or market indicator variable as well. The complete specification is explained 
by Equation (7). If the Hi LOC variable is significantly positive, controlling for other 
financial constraint measures, then we can conclude that the usage o f credit lines is 
important on its own and not merely substituting for other financial constraint measures. 
We also include indicator variables for bond rating and commercial paper, as they were 
significant in Table 4.
38
Table 5. Risk-Adjusted Return vs. Total LOC Pereent o f Liquidity
This table provides OLS regression results o f  monthly risk-adjusted returns, r*, on size, and book to market 
ratio, and LOC variables. Data are from sample firms from 1997-2010 that have access to lines o f  credit.
1997-2003 data is from Amir Sufi’s (2009) study. 2004-2010 data was hand collected for this study. 
Accounting data are from COM PUSTAT. Line o f  credit data are from Amir Sufi’s website (1997-2003) 
and firm 10-K reports (2004-2010). Risk adjusted returns were calculated using the Fama-MacBeth 
method with the Fama-French 1- and 3-Factor market model as the baseline as indicated and CRSP return 
data. Size is the natural logarithm o f  the firm's otal assets. BTM is the book to market ratio,
— of the—lII2— LOCXotal is the natural logarithm o f  the total amount o f  lines o f  credit, used and
T ota i S h ares x S h are  Price
unused. HiLOC, HiLOC2, and HiLOC3 are dummy variables for 3 different methods o f  defining high 
LOCs users. HiLOC takes the value o f  1 if  a firm has a L.OCusedRatio higher than the median and 0 
otherwise. HiLOC2 takes the value o f  I if  a firm’s LOCUsedRatio is in the top 30%  o f  the sample and 0 if 
LOCUsedRatio is in the bottom 30%. HiLOC3 takes the value o f  1 if  a firm’s LOCUsedRatio is in the top 
30% for each year and 0 if  LOCUsedRatio is in the bottom 30% for each year. Industry dummies are 
calculated using the Fama French 12 industry SIC codes. Crisis is a dummy variable that takes the value o f  
I if  a observation is in 2007 or 2008 and takes the value o f  0 otherwise. T-statistics are calculated with 
heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. ***. **, * are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.
A: I-F actor M odel B: 3-Factor M odel
Param eter HiLOC HiLOC '2 H iLOC 3 HiLOC HiLOC2 HiLOC3
Intercept -8.15*** -9.68*** -9.65*** -9 10*** - 11.00*** -10.85***
(-15.61) (-15.39) (-15.05) (-14.62) (-14.87) (-14.45)
Size 0 92*** 1.30*** 1.16*** 1 09*** 1.54*** I 4 | ***
(10.53) ( 11.22) (10.46) (9.70) (10.99) (10.30)
BTM 11 1 *** j |7*** 1. 11*** 1.03*** 1.09*** 1.02***
(5.20) (5.18) (4.93) (4.55) (4.54) (4.24)
LOCTotal 0.04 -0.15* -0 01 0.01 -0.25** -0.1 1
(0 .66) (-1 .85) (-0 . 10) (0.15) (-2.32) (-1.09)
Crisis -0.03 0.12 -0.03 0.67*** 0.79*** 0.61**
(-0.17) (0.50) (-0 . 12) (2.65) (2.59) (2 .02)
HiLOC q 47***
(3.23)
0.45**
(2.53)
HiLOC2 0.40**
(1.97)
0.42*
(1.72)
HiLOC 3 Q ^9 ***
(2.69)
0.53**
(2 .22)
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 18995 13657 13507 18995 13657 13507
Adj R-Squared  0.0521 0.0625 0.0619 0.0394 0.0493 0.0484
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Table 6 reports these regression results. Although less statistically robust than in 
Table 5, the HiLOC  indicator variable still is significantly positively related to returns. 
The HiLOC  coefficients are 0.32 and 0.33 for the BondRate and CommPaper models, 
respectively. As expected, the coefficients o f BondRate and CommPaper measures o f 
financial constraint are negative and highly significant at the 1% level. Firms with a bond 
rating or credit rating are not financially constrained and consistent with previous studies 
(Whited and Wu (2006), Livdan, Sapriza and Zhang (2009)) are associated with lower 
returns in the cross section.
We also control for market movements using indicator variables based on the CFNAI 
measures. Once again, HiLOC  is positive in each model, with a coefficient o f 0.45 and 
5% level o f significance. However, we do not find any relationship between the market 
expansion/contraction and returns in the cross section. This is likely due to the fact that 
risk-adjusted returns control for market movements. In all, we find evidence suggesting 
that controlling for other financial constraint measures and market movements, investors 
demand higher returns in the cross section for holding stock in firms that use a high 
percentage of their credit lines. This result provides further evidence suggesting that these 
high LOC users are financially constrained.
Influence o f  credit line usage on investment and profitability
We next examine two additional areas that may reveal differences between high 
and low users o f credit lines: corporate investment and profitability. If, as we propose, 
high users o f credit lines are financially constrained, we would expect high users to
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Table 6. Risk-Adjusted Returns by Financial Constraint Measures
This table provides OLS regression results o f  risk-adjusted returns, r*, on size, book to market ratio, LOC 
variables and financial constraint variables. Data are from sample firms from 1997-2010 that have access to 
lines o f  credit. 1997-2003 data is from Amir S ufi’s (2009) study. 2004-2010 data was hand collected for 
this study. Accounting data are from COM PUSTAT. Line o f  credit data are from Amir Sufi’s website 
(1997-2003) and firm 10-K reports (2004-2010). Risk adjusted returns were calculated using the Fama- 
MacBeth method with the Fama-French 3-Factor market model and CRSP return data. Size is the natural
logarithm o f  the firm’s total assets. BTM is the book to market ratio, ft.-— ......... LOCTotal is
T ota l  Shares  x S h a r e  Price
the natural logarithm o f  the total amount o f  lines o f  credit, used and unused. HiLOC takes the value o f  I if  t 
a firm is has a LOCUsedRatio higher than the median and 0 otherwise. Crisis is a dummy variable that 
takes the value o f  1 if  a observation is in 2007 or 2008 and takes the value o f  0 otherwise. BondRate takes 
the value o f  1 if  a firm has a bond rating and 0 otherwise. CommPaper takes the value o f  1 if  a firm has a 
commercial paper rating and 0 otherwise. High DivPay takes the value o f  1 if a firm's dividend payout ratio 
is in the top 30% o f  the sample by year and 0 if  the dividend payout is in the bottom 30% by year. High 
Assets takes the value o f  1 if  a firm’s assets in the top 30% o f  the sample by year and 0 if  assets rank in the 
bottom 30% by year. Constrained firms are those with bond rating = 0, CommPaper " 0, High DivPay=0, 
HighAssets = 0; Up takes the values o f  i for months when the market is expanding at a rate greater than 
average (Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) greater than 0) and 0 otherwise. Up3 takes the 
values o f  I for months when the 3-month m oving average o f  the CFNAI is greater than 0 and 0 otherwise. 
Industry dummies are calculated using the Fama French 12 industry SIC codes. T-statistics are calculated 
with heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. ***, **, * are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.
Param eter BondRate Com m Paper Up Up3
Intercept -10.76*** -9.67*** _9 ] ]*** >9 j 7***
(-15.44) (-14.85) (-14.20) (-14 .24)
Size 1.46*** | ]7*** 1 09*** } 09 ***
(11.65) (10.15) (9.72) (9.77)
BTM 5 03*** 1.03*** 1 03*** 1.03***
(4.60) (4.55) (4.52) (4.53)
LOCTotal 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.01
(0 .66) (0.72) (0.15) (0.14)
HiLOC 0.32* 0.33* 0.45** 0.45**
(L 81) (1.83) (2.53) (2.50)
Crisis 0.52** 0.67*** 0 .68** 0.72***
(2.04) (2.63) (2.57) (2 .68 )
BondRate -2.77***
(-11.99)
Com m Paper • 2.1 1***
( - 10.66)
Up 0.02
(0 . 10)
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Param eter BondRate Com m Paper Up Up3
Up3 0.10
(0 .55)
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes
O bservations 18995 18995 18995 18995
A dj R-Squared 0.0457 0.0414 0.0393 0.0393
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engage in less investment and have lower levels o f  accounting profitability than low 
LOC (unconstrained) firms.
Table 7 reports the OLS regression results o f  corporate investment (Capex, R&D , 
and Employment) on the LOC usage variables as described in Equation (5), based on the 
Campello, Giambona, Graham and Harvey (2011) regression specification. Panels A, B 
and C show results when high users o f  credit lines are defined as greater than the median 
o f the sample, top 30% o f  the sample, and top 30% by year, respectively. This 
stratification allows stronger conclusions to be drawn from the regression results, as there 
are larger differences between high and low users o f  credit lines.
First, we examine the main hypothesis, that high users of credit lines will have 
lower levels o f investment because they are not able to benefit from the liquidity 
insurance property of credit lines. In Panel A, the negative coefficients o f  HiLOC  for 
Capex and Empl (-152.04 and -4.51, respectively) are significant at the 1% level. We 
obtain nearly identical results in Panels B and C; the coefficients o f HILOC2 and 
HiLOC3 for Capex and Employment expenditures are negative and significant at the 1% 
level in all cases. These results provide support for our conjecture that high LOC users, as 
financially constrained firms, are less likely to deploy lines o f  credit for investment 
purposes. Although Campello. Graham and Harvey (2010) examine firms only during the 
financial crisis, our results consistent with theirs show that investment is reduced for 
financially constrained firms. However, the results for R&D are quite different from the 
results o f Capex and Employment. In all panels, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between credit line usage and investment in R&D. This result indicates that 
risky corporate investment is most often funded by cash.
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Looking next at the coefficient o f LOCTotal. we find that lines o f  credit are 
positively related to both Capex and employment investment. Regardless o f the model 
used, the coefficient o f LOCTotal is positive and significant at the 1% level in all cases. 
Consistent with Campello, Giambona, Graham and Harv ey (2011) we find strong 
evidence that credit lines allow firms to increase their level o f investment above the level 
they could have achieved with cash alone. In Panels A, B, and C, the coefficients o f the 
interacted variable Cash*LOCTotal are positive and significant at the 1% level for Capex 
with t-statistics o f 4.34, 4.77, and 4.72, respectively. Again, in line with Campello. 
Giambona. Graham and Harvey (2011) credit lines do not appear to boost corporate 
investment in R&D  or employment. Cash is significantly and positively related to both 
R&D and employment expenditures for all three definitions o f high credit line users. 
However, the coefficient o f the interacted variable {Cash*LOCTotal) is not significantly 
different from zero for R&D expenditures and is negative for employment expenditures. 
While the results o f Table 7 indicate that LOCs are positively associated with corporate 
investment, high LOC users invest considerably less in capital expenditures and 
employment that low LOC users. This evidence provides additional support for our 
conjecture that high LOC users, as financially constrained firms, are more likely to use 
their lines o f credit for non-investment purposes. Hence, firms with high LOC 
drawdowns are also expected to be less profitable.
The next area o f  our investigation centers on the effect of high LOC usage on 
profitability. As discussed so far. since high LOC users are unable to take advantage the 
liquidity insurance function of credit lines and less able to invest efficiently in capex and
Table 7. Determinants of Investment Spending
This table provides OLS regression results based on the Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey (2009) specification. Data are from sample firms from 1997- 
2010 that have access to lines o f  credit. 1997-2003 data is from Amir Sufi’s (2009) study. 2004-2010 data was hand collected for this study. Annual accounting 
data are from COMPUSTAT. Line o f  credit data are from Amir Sufi’s website (1997-2003) and firm 10-K reports (2004-2010). Dependent variables are Capex, 
R&D, and Employment in separate models. Capex is the annual firm capital expenditures in plant, property, and equipment. R&D is the annual expenditure on 
Research and Development. Employees are the number o f  employees. Size is the natural logarithm o f  the firm’s total assets. Cash is the annual amount o f  cash 
(stock). LOCTotal is the total amount o f  lines o f  credit, used and unused. HiLOC, HiLOC2, and HiLOC3 are dummy variables for 3 different methods o f  
defining high LOCs users. HiLOC takes the value o f  1 if a firm is has a LOCusedRatio higher than the median and 0 otherwise. HiLOC2 takes the value o f  1 if a 
firm’s LOCUsedRatio is in the top 30% o f  the sample and 0 if  LOCUsedRatio is in the bottom 30%. HiLOC3 takes the value o f  1 if the firm’s LOCUsedRatio is 
in the top 30% for each year and 0 if LOCUsedRatio is in the bottom 30% for each year. Industry dummies are calculated using the Fama French 12 industry SIC 
codes. T-statistics are calculated with heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. ***, **, * are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
A • HiLOC B: HiLOC2 C: HiLOC3
Parameter Capex R&D Empl Capex R&D Empl Capex R&D Empl
Intercept 262.56** -54.99 -8.25** 312.73** -84.31 -1.24 316.21** -87.16 -1.46
(2.30) (-1.31) (-2 .00) (2.31) (-1.58) (-0.30) (2.32) (-1.57) (-0.34)
Size -45.52* 12.98 o 94*** -60.11* 22.90* 0.64 -62.48* 24.32* 0.55
(-1.65) (1.34) (3.15) ( - 1.88) (1.82) (0.74) (-1.92) (1.91) (0.61)
Cash -0.31 0.83*** 0 .02** -0.34 Q qQ*** 0 .01** -0.34 0 .88*** 0 .01**
(-1.39) (4.94) (2.58) (-1.40) (6.46) (2.13) (-1.39) (6.05) (2 . 12)
LOCTotal 1 34*** -0 .20*** 0.03*** 1.57*** -0.29*** 0.06*** 1.57*** -0.30*** 0.06***
(6.27) (-4.11) (4.63) (4.43) (-4.65) (5.47) (4.48) (-4.73) (5.43)
Cash* LOCTotal 0 .00*** 0.00 -0 .00* 0 .00*** 0.00 -0 .00*** 0 .00*** 0.00 -0 .00***
(4.34) (0.72) (-1.96) (4.77) (0.65) (-2.81) (4.72) (0.81) (-2.80)
HiLOC -152.04*** 2.20 -4 5 1 * * *
(-5.23) (0.17) (-4.18)
A. HiLOC B: HiLOC2 C. HiLOC 3
Parameter Capex R&D Empl Capex R&D Empl Capex R&D Empl
M L 0C 2 -131.55*** 2.45 -4 7 ] * * *
(-4.45) (0.14) (-3.64)
HiLOC 3 -132.16*** 4.69 -5.07***
(-4.51) (0.30) (-3.97)
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1402 826 1389 1004 588 993 988 584 978
Adj R-Squared 0.8099 0.7264 0.5567 0.7782 0.7530 0.5477 0.7817 0.7483 0.5510
46
employment, we expect them to be less profitable than firms that do not extensively use 
their credit lines.
To examine this final prediction, we regress ROA, EBITDA scaled by total assets, 
and ROE, our three profitability measures, against LOCTotal, the HiLOC  measures, 
controlling for other effects, as listed in Equation (6). The results, reported in Table 8, 
once again show strong support for our hypothesis. When profitability is measured by 
ROA in Panels A, B, and C the coefficient o f the HiLOC  indicator variable is negative 
and significant at the 1% level (t-statistics o f -2.74, -3.56. and -3.66, respectively). With 
EBITDA as the profitability measure, the coefficient of the HiLOC  variable is not 
statistically different from 0 in Panel A. However, when there is a stronger delineation 
between high and low users, as in Panels B and C, the coefficients are negative and 
significant at the 5% level. The coefficients for HiLOC  in the ROE models are also 
negative and significant in all cases. Additionally, the coefficient on the LOCTotal is 
positive and significant at the 1% level in all models, showing that firms that have access 
to credit lines are associated with higher profitability. The results o f  Table 8 provide final 
support for our hypothesis that the degree o f credit line usage does reflect financial 
constraint. High LOC users have lower accounting performance than low users. 
CONCLUSION
The study o f credit line drawdowns is in its early stages. Unlike previous studies, we 
address the important question why firms with access to credit lines have different 
drawdowns. We hypothesize that high LOC users are more financially constrained than
Table 8. Determinants of Profitability
This table provides OLS regression results based on the Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey (2009) specification. Data are from sample firms from 1997- 
2010 that have access to lines o f  credit. 1997-2003 data is from Amir Sufi’s (2009) study. 2004-2010 data was hand collected for this study. Dependent variables 
are ROA, EBITDA/Assets and ROE. Annual accounting data are from COMPUSTAT. Line o f  credit data are from Amir Sufi’s website (1997-2003) and firm
10-K reports (2004-2010). Size is the natural logarithm o f  the firm’s total assets. BTM is the book to market ratio, -  LOCTotal is the
Total  Shares  x Share Price
natural logarithm o f  the total amount o f  lines o f  credit, used and unused HiLOC, HiLOC2, and HiLOC3 are dummy variables for 3 different methods o f  
defining high LOCs users. HiLOC takes the value o f  I if a firm has a LOCUsedRatio higher than the median and 0 otherwise. HiLOC2 takes the value o f  1 if  a 
firm’s LOCUsedRatio is in the top 30% o f  the sample and 0 if LOCUsedRatio is in the bottom 30%. HiLOC3 takes the value o f  1 if  a firm’s LOCUsedRatio is in 
the top 30% for each year and 0 if  LOCUsedRatio is in the bottom 30% for each year. Industry dummies are calculated using the Fama French 12 industry SIC 
codes. T-statistics are calculated with heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. ***, **, * are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
A: HiLOC B: HiLOC2 C: HiLOC 3
Parameter ROA EBITDA/Assets ROE ROA EBITDA/Assets ROE ROA EBITDA/Assets ROE
Intercept -0.00 Q Q9**# 1.28 0.03 q | 2*** 13.74 0.02 0 . 11*** 9.48
(-0.16) (3.63) (0.13) (0 .88) (4.06) (1.27) (0.72) (3.62) (0.82)
Size -0.01 -0.01 -1.81 -0 .01* -0 .01** -3.57* -0 .01* -0 .01** -3.08
(-1.25) (-1.47) (-U09) ( - 1.66) (-2.14) (-1.65) ( - 1.88) (-2.17) (-1.44)
BTM -0 .02** -0.03** -12.25** -0 .02** -0 .02* -12.77** -0 .02** -0 .02* -12.64**
(-2.13) (-2.07) (-2.26) (-1.99) (-1.92) (-2.38) (-1.98) (-1.90) (-2.35)
LOCTotal 0 .02*** 0 .02*** 7.77** 0 Q2*** 0 .02*** 9.64** 0 .02*** 0 .02*** 9.51**
(3.51) (4.67) (2.40) (2.96) (4.16) (1.99) (3.30) (4.42) (2.17)
HiLOC -0 .02***
(-2.74)
-0.01
(-1.55)
-14.00*
(-1.75)
HiLOC2 -0.04***
(-3.56)
-0 .02**
(-2 .01)
-20.29**
(-1.98)
A: HiLOC
Parameter ROA EBITDA/Assets ROE
HiLOC'3
Year Dummies yes yes yes
Industry Dummies yes yes yes
Observations 1414 1413 1398
Adj R-Squared 0.0722 0.1223 0 0 2 4 9
B: HiLOC2 C: HiLOC 3
EBITDA/Assets ROE ROA EBITDA/Assets ROE
-0.04*** -0 .02** -21.31**
(-3.66) (-2.27) (-2 .00)
yes yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes yes
1014 999 998 997 982
0. i 325 0.0291 j  0.0732 0.1308 0.0302
4^
00
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low users. Consequently, we also conjecture that high LOC user firms will be associated 
with higher stock returns. Finally, because the liquidity insurance properties o f credit 
lines are only available to firms with low LOC drawdowns they are expected to lose the 
ability to employ credit lines for liquidity insurance purposes leading to lower investment 
and profitability.
We address these issues and find strong evidence in support o f  our first conjecture 
that firms with LOW usage are more financially constrained than firms with low LOC 
usage. High LOC users are smaller and less liquid than low LOC users. High users are 
also less likely to have a bond rating and access to commercial paper. We also examine 
the influence o f credit line usage in the cross section o f returns, using different methods 
o f calculating risk-adjusted returns and for three alternative methods o f defining high 
LOCs users, and find them to be associated with higher stock returns than low LOC 
users. This pattern persists even after controlling for other financial constraint measures 
and the state o f macroeconomic conditions. Finally, we find that high LOC users relative 
to low LOC users have lower investment in capital expenditures and profitability than 
low LOC users. Overall, our evidence suggests that credit line usage, and not just access 
to lines o f credit, is a more effective way to identify whether a firm is financially 
constrained.
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CHAPTER II
CREDIT LINE USAGE DURING THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INTRODUCTION
The theoretical literature suggests lines o f credit (LOCs) enable firms to smooth 
cash flows thereby allowing firms to invest during times o f limited credit availability 
(Campbell (1978), Hawkins (1982), Shockley and Thakor (1997), Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1998), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007)). This literature suggests that LOCs provide 
liquidity insurance that helps firms maintain value-enhancing corporate investment when 
other forms o f  liquidity are limited.
However, recent empirical studies have called into question the effectiveness o f 
LOCs as liquidity insurance. Sufi (2009) provides early evidence that cash flow 
influences LOC usage. He finds that low cash flow firms are less likely to use LOCs than 
firms with higher cash flows. Since then, the literature has uncovered limitations o f LOC 
usage due to the economic environment (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Berrospide, 
Meisenzahl and Sullivan (2012)) and due to a firm's financial health (Jimenez, Lopez and 
Saurina (2009), Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010)). Additionally, Lins, Servaes and 
Tufano (2010) suggest that LOCs are more difficult to use during periods o f  limited 
credit availability. Jimenez, Lopez and Saurina (2009) and Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito 
and Perez (2012) argue that bank monitoring may also limit LOC usage. These empirical 
studies suggest that there are limits to the deployment o f credit lines that may hinder their 
liquidity insurance effectiveness.
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This disagreement between the theoretical predictions and recent empirical 
research on the LOCs suggests that additional study is warranted. On one hand, theory 
states that LOCs may be activated to maintain steady cash flows. This cash flow 
smoothing should enable firms to invest during credit-restricted periods. On the other 
hand, empirical studies indicate that firms may have difficulty activating LOCs when the 
economic environment is unfavorable. To address this gap between the theoretical and 
empirical literature, we examine the question: How do firms use LOCs during the 2008 
financial crisis? Specifically, we examine credit line usage and corporate investment in 
Capex, employment, and R&D to determine if LOCs aid firms in avoiding investment 
declines during times o f reduced credit availability when compared to the earlier period 
o f credit stability. In addressing this question we provide evidence that LOCs may be 
limited in their ability to provide liquidity insurance in unfavorable economic conditions.
The ability to test this theoretical prediction has been limited due to the scarce 
availability o f credit line data and the short duration o f previous credit-constrained 
periods. However, the recent global financial turmoil provides an ideal exogenous event 
that enables us to perform a direct investigation to learn how firms use credit lines in a 
crisis. When the housing bubble burst in 2007, falling housing values undermined the 
subprime mortgage markets and associated securitized financial products crashed. Credit 
market unrest peaked in the aftermath o f the delisting o f Lehman Brothers in September 
2008. However, even as the U.S. federal government intervened to inject solvency in 
select institutions, credit markets remained tight, making this challenging environment 
for corporate liquidity management an ideal laboratory for our study.
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We conduct our empirical analysis with a unique dataset o f integrated credit line 
and financial data. We manually collect information on credit line drawdowns from firm 
10-Ks from 2004 to 2010 and combine it with the credit line usage data from Amir Sufi’s 
website for a total dataset o f credit line usage from 1996-2010. We then combine the 
credit line data with financial information from Compustat. Since literature suggests 
liquidity hedging may increase credit line usage (Disatnik, Duchin and Schmidt (2009). 
Berrospide, Meisenzahl and Sullivan (2012)) we also hand-collect information from 10- 
Ks about whether or not each firm hedges its revolving debt. In all, we have credit line, 
hedging, and financial data on 300 firms from 1996-2010.
We empirically test the theoretical prediction that credit lines provide liquidity 
insurance by examining the influence o f LOC access and LOC usage on corporate 
investment in periods before and during the recent financial crisis. We first examine LOC 
access and find that firms are equally likely to have access to LOCs in both the pre-crisis 
and crisis periods. We then assess the impact o f LOCs on corporate investment by 
regressing Capex, employment, and R&D on firm financial variables. We find it is only 
in combination with cash that LOCs increase the ability o f a firm to invest in Capex and 
employment. The LOC variable on its own is not statistically significant in our model.
Next, we look at LOC usage, rather than LOC access, by using a measure o f 
LOCs drawn down in our analysis. We find that among firms with access to LOCs, those 
whose usage is greater than the median (an indicator o f constraint) invest less in Capex 
and employment. Additionally, our analysis o f these high LOC users shows that LOCs do 
not impact their investment differently during the crisis when compared with the period 
o f  normal credit availability prior to the crisis. The largest contributor to the decrease in
53
investment is the financial crisis itself, and the crisis effect is not mitigated by LOC 
usage. In all, contrary to theoretical predictions, we find strong evidence that firms are 
not using LOCs to invest during the crisis period. Our findings suggest that LOCs may 
not be able to provide effective liquidity insurance that allows value-enhancing 
investment to continue during severe credit market conditions.
This study makes contributions to several strands o f  literature. We add to the risk 
management literature with our finding that credit line hedging positively influences 
LOC drawdowns and negatively influences corporate investment. However, our main 
contributions are to the liquidity management and investment literatures. By investigating 
LOC usage during the financial crisis, we are able to provide information concerning 
liquidity management and investment in distressed economic times, when liquidity 
should be most valuable. We confirm that credit lines do improve the ability o f a firm to 
invest above the amount that could have occurred with cash alone. We also provide solid 
evidence that credit line usage is consistent across pre-crisis and crisis periods - a finding 
suggesting that LOCs are not more extensively used during a financial crisis than during 
other periods o f greater credit availability. In all, our results add to the recent literature 
questioning the effectiveness o f LOCs’ theoretical role o f liquidity insurance and suggest 
that firms should not depend solely on LOCs to maintain investment during a crisis.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Credit lines are a significant source o f corporate liquidity. In the Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1998) theoretical model, LOCs are one o f the four ways firms are able to satisfy
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liquidity requirements10. By using LOCs, firms contract with financial institutions to 
ensure access to additional liquidity without going through the time and vetting process 
involved with obtaining other forms o f financing. Although both cash and LOCs may 
allow firms to engage in corporate investment without going to capital markets, LOCs 
have three properties that firms may find more valuable than cash: corporate governance, 
tax advantages, and liquidity insurance. Yun (2009) investigates whether the use o f LOCs 
influences corporate governance. He finds that managers are less likely to use LOCs than 
cash to misappropriate shareholders' wealth. He also reports that firms exhibiting poor 
corporate governance have more LOCs than cash in order to reduce the chance that 
managers will squander firm cash. Demiroglu and James (2011) state that LOCs have 
another advantage over cash in that interest payments are tax deductable, whereas interest 
earned from cash holdings is taxed. Unlike these studies that focus on LOCs from the 
corporate governance and tax advantages perspective, this paper examines the liquidity 
insurance property o f LOCs. Theoretical literature is unified in its assertion that LOCs 
enable firms to have access to liquidity on-demand (Campbell (1978), Hawkins (1982), 
Shockley and Thakor (1997), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), DeMarzo and Fishman 
(2007)). The "‘just in time” liquidity that LOCs provide is often called liquidity insurance 
because it potentially provides access to liquidity when funding may otherwise be 
difficult or costly to obtain.
However, recent empirical studies have raised some doubt about the ability o f 
LOCs to adequately provide liquidity insurance. Sufi (2009) is the first in-depth empirical 
study on LOCs. His main finding is that LOCs are employed mostly by firms with
“ issuing debt or equity, buying other firms, debt or equity, and buying government securities are the other 
three.
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significant positive cash flows. Furthermore, he finds that low cash flow firms tend to 
choose cash, rather than credit lines to satisfy liquidity requirements because bank lines 
o f credit often include loan covenants that restrict firms’ investment activities if  cash 
flow requirements are not met. Overall, his findings suggest that there may be limits to 
the effectiveness o f LOCs in providing liquidity insurance. In an international study 
utilizing survey data, Lins, Servaes and Tufano (2010) find evidence suggesting that 
firms are more likely to use LOCs during periods o f  economic growth. In fact, they find 
that firms prefer to use cash for meeting liquidity needs during times o f economic 
turmoil. The greater reliance on cash during economic crises seems to be consistent with 
the view that LOC users suffer a reduction in bank financing due to a market-wide credit 
supply contraction without being able to tap external (bond) financing (Adrian, Colla and 
Shin (2012)).
Further evidence that LOCs may provide limited liquidity insurance is implied by 
studies examining the monitoring power o f banks. Jimenez, Lopez and Saurina (2009) 
find a negative relationship between a firm’s age and amount of total LOCs the firm 
reports. This result is particularly strong for firms that use LOCs extensively. Jimenez, 
Lopez and Saurina (2009) suggest that over time, banks may reduce firm s’ access to 
LOCs. Likewise, Acharya, Almeida, lppolito and Perez (2012) find that banks use 
covenants to affect firm behavior, e.g., imposing restrictions on cash outlays for 
dividends or investment. By limiting firms’ usage o f funds from credit lines, the 
covenants may effectively reduce the LOCs' liquidity insurance properties. Taken 
together, these studies illustrate several limitations on LOCs’ ability to provide liquidity
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insurance". Hence, further study is required mainly for three reasons. First, most o f these 
studies examine the liquidity insurance properties o f credit lines during relatively calm or 
normal economic environments. This might be an explanation why previous studies find 
the liquidity insurance properties o f credit lines are limited. Instead, in line with the 
theoretical suggestion (Campbell (1978), Hawkins (1982), Shockley and Thakor (1997), 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007)) that LOC usage is 
expected to provide liquidity insurance during periods o f limited credit availability, we 
examine LOC usage around the recent financial crisis, a rare and economically important 
event o f tight credit conditions, to assess the liquidity insurance properties o f  credit lines. 
Since empirical studies suggest that the liquidity insurance properties o f  credit lines may 
be limited during normal times, we expect the LOC usage to be amplified during periods 
o f credit crisis. If true, such a result would imply that credit lines are most likely to be 
effective for liquidity insurance, precisely when firms need them the most. That is, if  
LOCs are acquired to protect firms against tight credit market conditions, they should 
hedge firms from the adversity o f limited credit availability. Consequently, firms will be 
able to use credit lines to maintain corporate investment during the 2008 financial crisis.
Second, while some recent literature investigates credit line usage during the 
recent financial crisis they rely on survey data due to the difficulty in obtaining 
drawdown information for LOCs. The survey-based analysis of Campello, Graham and 
Harvey (2010) shows that financially constrained firms planned to use more LOCs and 
cash during the 2008 financial crisis than firms that were more financially healthy. Using
11 Demiroglu and James (201 l) 's  review article summarizes the possible reasons for limitations on LOC’s 
ability to provide liquidity insurance as loan characteristics (financial covenants, material adverse change 
clauses, borrowing base, and performance pricing) and external factors such as the financial health o f  the 
lending institution and rollover risk.
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a different survey, Campello, Giambona, Graham and Harvey (2011) report that LOCs 
may help firms with high levels o f liquidity to engage in corporate investment during the 
crisis. However, drawing inferences about the impact o f LOCs on investment from 
survey-based data may be subject to some limitations that data from financial reports 
avoids. For example, in Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010), managers provide 
information about their projected investment plans during the financial crisis. However, it 
is unclear whether the proposed investment happened as planned. Furthermore, Pan and 
Statman (2012) argue that managers answer questions differently whether they are asked 
before or after an event. Unlike survey data, the dataset employed in this study provides a 
unique portrayal o f firms’ LOC usage that allows us to determine the effectiveness o f  
LOCs in practice during a period o f limited credit availability .
Third, most previous studies have not taken into account the fact that risk 
management may influence a firm’s ability to activate the liquidity insurance properties 
o f LOCs. Some firms choose to use derivatives such as interest rate swaps to reduce 
variability o f the cash flows. Disatnik, Duchin and Schmidt (2009) investigate the effects 
o f this cash flow hedging prior to the financial crisis and find that cash flow hedging 
diminishes a firm’s need for cash. They argue that since firms that engage in cash flow 
hedging need less cash, these hedging firms often choose credit lines to satisfy their 
liquidity requirements. Thus, cash flow hedging through the use o f derivatives such as 
interest rate swaps may offer firms an alternative method to smooth cash flows than using 
LOCs. Berrospide, Meisenzahl and Sullivan (2012) examine LOC usage during the 
crisis, focusing on three possible explanations for LOC drawdowns: interest rate risk, 
loan covenants, and hedging of the credit lines. They find evidence suggesting that during
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the crisis, firms that hedge their LOCs are more likely to draw down their credit lines 
more heavily than firms that do not engage in hedging. That is, LOC usage is likely to be 
greater if  firms hedge credit lines. Hence, liquidity insurance properties o f LOCs could 
be more pronounced. In fact, the interest rate hedging documented by Berrospide, 
Meisenzahl and Sullivan (2012) may be an effort o f  firms to escape the limits to liquidity 
insurance, particularly cash flow-based covenants. Both Disatnik, Duchin and Schmidt
(2009) and Berrospide, Meisenzahl and Sullivan (2012) focus on the impact o f interest 
rates and interest rate hedging on LOC usage, which has been ignored in much o f the 
previous literature. This omission may be another reason that the literature has been 
unable to verify the liquidity insurance properties o f  L OCs. In our study, we account for 
hedging to shed light on how interest rate hedging affects the use o f LOCs and a firm 's 
ability to use LOCs for investment. Hedging should have a positive impact on investment 
or at least allow firms to avoid the adverse effects o f  tight credit conditions on investment 
levels.
The study that is most closely related to ours is Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)’s 
analysis o f  how the 2008 financial crisis influenced the credit supply. Their investigation 
centers on both LOC usage and investment from the perspective o f the lending 
institutions. They are primarily concerned with understanding how panic-driven 
aggregate credit line drawdowns affected the ability o f banks to continue making other 
types o f loans. Since they do not have data on credit line drawdowns, they augment their 
supply-side analysis with a small sample o f credit line drawdowns from 24 firms during 
five months in 2008. These drawdowns were reported in the news and therefore thought 
to represent surprise or unexpected drawdowns. They find that unanticipated drawdowns
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increased significantly during the crisis, while cash levels increased, suggesting that firms 
were hoarding cash rather than using LOCs as liquidity insurance to maintain investment. 
We build on this study by taking a more in-depth look at all credit line drawdowns (rather 
than surprise drawdowns) over 15 years. We examine how access to credit lines and 
credit line drawdowns before and during the financial crisis influence corporate 
investment, and whether the credit lines enable firms to avoid decreases in investment as 
the theoretical literature suggests. Our demand-foe used test o f  the theoretical prediction 
that LOCs provide liquidity insurance complements Ivashina and Scharfstein (201 Of s 
predominantly supply-side paper, and contributes to the literature by enhancing our 
understanding o f the role o f LOCs in the financial crisis.
DATA
Our dataset, consists o f a random sample o f 300 firms from Compustat spanning 
the period from 1996 to 2010. These firms represent 6.5% o f firms that had at least four 
consecutive years o f financial data between 1996 and 2003, as used in Sufi's study. LOC 
usage for 2004 to 2010 was collected from the 10-Ks using the procedure documented in 
Sufi (2009). Specifically, 10-Ks were downloaded from the U.S. Securities and Exchange
1 7Commission’s EDGAR website. We then read the 10-K looking for notes that reported 
the amount o f total credit lines, used and unused. Only committed credit lines with 
banking institutions were recorded. Letters o f credit and credit lines engaged for the sole 
purpose o f supporting a commercial paper program were excluded. LOC drawdown
■ -j
information from 1996 to 2003 was retrieved from Sufi’s website .
12 http://www.sec.gov7edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm
13 http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/amir.sufi/data.html
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Firms that engage in LOC hedging may be able to mitigate the effect o f restrictive 
covenants, thereby maintaining the liquidity insurance properties o f their LOCs. 
Therefore, we collected hedging data for each o f  the 300 firms by reading the 10-Ks to 
account for possible LOC hedging effects in our experiments. Following Berrospide, 
Meisenzahl and Sullivan (2012), we employed a search engine to look for the hedging 
terms (“interest rate agreement,” “interest rate agreements,” “ interest rate exchange 
agreement,” “interest rate exchange agreements,” “ interest rate hedge,” “interest rate 
hedges,” “interest rate swap,” “interest rate swaps”) within 1500 characters o f LOC terms 
(“credit facility,” “credit facilities.” “credit line,” “credit lines,” “line o f credit,” “ lines of 
credit,” “loan facility,” “loan facilities,” “revolving facility,” “term loan,” “term 
loans”) 14. We then read the documents to determine if  the firm stated that the LOCs were 
hedged. We found evidence that some firms were required to hedge their LOCs as a 
condition having access to the credit lines. Other firms were voluntarily hedging their 
LOCs. Many firms did not report whether or not hedging was required. Flowever, our 
investigation shows that few sample firms engage in this practice o f hedging their LOCs. 
Specifically, we were able to identify only 23 firms that hedged LOCs for any time 
during the 1996-2010 period. Only 19 firms hedged their LOCs for more than one year.
Finally, the credit line drawdowns and hedging information are combined with 
Compustat financial variables for a final sample o f 300 firms over 15 years. Table 9 
provides descriptive statistics for the sample. Panel A reports statistics for the entire 
sample, while Panel B breaks down the sample into periods that are unaffected by the 
credit crisis (1996-2006) and those affected by the financial crisis (2007-2010). We refer
14 Although w e do not report hedging o f  term loans, w e follow  Berrospide et al (2012) practice o f  including 
the search term to be conservative.
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to these two periods as pre-crisis and crisis, respectively. The crisis period includes 2007, 
since Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find that the impact o f  the credit crisis on bank 
lending began to be felt in 2007.
For the 1996-2010 period, Panel A shows that most sample firms utilized LOCs. 
Our sample firms had access to credit lines in 68% o f the firm-year observations. The 
median sample firm had cash flow of 0.111. These values are similar to those reported in 
Disatnik, Duchin and Schmidt (2009), who state that 71.2% of their firms have access to 
LOCs with a sample median cash flow o f  0.106. In Panel B we divide the sample into 
pre-crisis (1996-2006) and crisis (2007-2010) time periods to see if  the crisis had any 
impact on access to credit lines. We see that access to LOCs increased from 66.9% before 
the crisis to 73.7% during the crisis, a statistically significant change. Mean total LOCs 
also increased from 263.6 to 385.4. These results are in line with Ivashina and Scharfstein
(2010)'s finding that firms increased credit lines after the delisting o f Lehman Brothers in 
an attempt to secure future credit. Firms during the crisis period also had more cash and 
corporate investment (Capex, R&D, and employment) than firm-year observations in the 
pre-crisis period. Median cash levels increased threefold (10.3 to 32.9), which is in line 
with the evidence o f Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) indicating that firms tend to hoard 
cash during the recent financial crisis. However, not surprisingly, during the crisis period 
firms experienced a reduction in liquidity (current assets/total assets) o f 5.5% over the 
pre-crisis firms. Before the crisis, firms also had a lower cash-adjusted net worth 
^Assets-cash-Liabilities pre_crjsis firms (-0.530 versus 0.338). Adrian, Colla and Shin
A sse ts -C a sh  1
(2012) show that during the recent financial crisis, bank lending to firms declined 
substantially: loan issuance dropped 75%, and the probability of obtaining a loan fell by
62
14%. Given the economic environment o f reduced lending, as well as the deteriorating 
financial positions and increasing cash positions during the crisis, the increases in 
investment seem to be driven by cash, at least at a univariate level o f analysis.
We next examine sample firm characteristics by industry' during the pre-crisis and 
crisis periods to see if most firms increased their credit lines during the crisis, or if  the 
phenomenon was driven by a few key industries. In Table 10, we find that the tendency 
of firms to increase credit lines during the crisis is indeed prevalent. All industries, except 
for Non-durables and Chemicals, increased firms’ access to credit lines after 2006. Non­
durables’ LOC access remained constant at 81% and Chemical experienced a decrease in 
percentage o f firms with LOC access from 75.6% to 63.6%. In fact, several industries 
(Durables, Energy, Telephone and TV, Utilities) had 100% o f firm-year observations 
with LOCs in the crisis period, although this observation is tempered by the fact that 
there are fewer observations in the crisis period. There is great variation in the amount of 
corporate investment and cash across different industries, which requires us to control for 
industry effects in our multivariate analysis. However, most industries saw a significant 
increase in cash during the crisis period which suggests that the cash-hoarding behavior 
was widespread and not confined to a few industries.
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics (Total and by Crisis Period)
This table provides summary statistics for the variables used in this study. Panel A reports the entire sample o f  300 firms. Panel B reports the data divided into 
pre-crisis and crisis periods. LOCTotal is the total amount o f  lines o f credit, used and unused for firms with access to LOCs. LOCUsedRatio  is L0CUsed _ LineYes
r  r  LOCTotal
is an indicator variable that takes the value o f  1 if  the firm-year observation has access to LOCs and 0 otherwise. Cash is the amount o f  cash (stock). Capex is the 
annual firm capital expenditures in plant, property, and equipment. R&D  is the annual expenditure on research and development. Employment is the number of
employees. ROA is - e- incomE C ash flow  is calculated as —EBITD-A— . Liquidity■ is liquid assets divided by total assets. MTB is the cash-adjusted book to market
Assets A sse ts-C ash
B ookValueo f  E qu ity+ M arke tV a tueo fE qu i ty -C ash  . . , , , , A sse ts -C ash -L iab i l i t ie s  . _  . . . . . .  TangibleAsse ts  . . . .  . r
ratio,------------------------------------------------------------- . NetWorth is calculated a s -------------------------------. AssetTaneihihtv i s  . N is the number or
Non-CashTota lAsse ts  Asse ts-C ash  '  TotalAssets
observations.
Panel A: Entire sample period
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum
LOCTotal 2348 285.824 50.100 753.034 0.100 14671.000
LOCUsedRatio 2348 0.262 0.115 0.311 0.000 1.000
LineYes 3451 0.680 1.000 0.466 0.000 1.000
Cash 3451 103.948 12.667 432.548 0.000 9782.000
Capex 3431 145.918 8,413 973.630 0.000 17633.000
R&D 2206 63.362 3.397 352.888 0.000 5273.000
Employment 3348 10.489 1 151 32.784 0.000 366.000
ROA 3448 -0.127 0.026 1.083 -44.500 1.798
CashFlow 3401 -0.113 0.111 1.503 -38.500 3.513
Liquidity 3361 0.540 0.558 0.247 0.027 1.000
MTB 3275 3.420 1.472 11.291 -89.615 276.328
NetWorth 3396 0.192 0.465 5.240 -255.125 0.998
AssetTangibility 3406 0.290 0.223 0.231 0.000 0.961
ONUJ
Panel B: Pre-crisis and crisis periods
1996-2006 2007-2010
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Delta Mean
LOCTotal 1920 263.624 46 781 428 385.415 112.850 121.791***
LOCUsedRatio 1920 0.270 0.140 428 0.224 0.010 -0.046***
LineYes 2870 0.669 1.000 581 0.737 1.000 0.068***
Cash 2870 77.403 10.307 581 235.073 32.877 157.670***
Capex 2853 125.673 7.669 578 245.847 16.182 120.174*
R&D 1814 52.153 3.404 392 115.233 3.331 63.080**
Employment 2785 9.675 i .051 563 14.513 2.086 4.838***
ROA 2867 -0.120 0.026 581 0.162 0 027 -0.042
CashFlow 2826 -0.102 0.112 575 -0.164 0.107 -0.062
Liquidity 2795 0.546 0.565 566 0.514 0.525 -0.03***
MTB 2720 3.439 1.530 555 3.327 1.294 -0.11
NetWorth 2826 0 338 0.474 570 -0.530 0.402 -0 .868*
AssetTangibility 2830 0.291 0.224 576 0.286 0.211 •0.005
O n4^
Table 10. LOC Access and Investment by Industry and Crisis Period
This table provides mean LOC access and investment information by industry and crisis time period. LineYes is an indicator variable that takes the value o f  I if 
the firm-year observation has access to LOCs and 0 otherwise. Cash  is the amount o f  cash (stock). Capex is the annual firm capital expenditures in plant, 
property, and equipment. R&D  is the annual expenditure on research and development. Employment is the number o f  employees. N is the number o f  
observations.
Pre-Crisis (19%  -2006) Crisis (2007 -  2010)
Industry> LineYes Cash Capex R&D Employment N LineYes Cash Capex R&D Employment N
Non-Durables 0.810 27.222 22.712 5.381 4.176 200 0.810 47.531 10.609 4.831 2.584 21
Durables 0.731 156.607 219.988 298.731 33.939 78 1.000 669.200 261.267 527.933 50.778 9
Manufacturing 0.834 32.294 44,627 28.452 6.794 452 0.853 137.539 59.838 36.751 7.331 102
Energy’ 0.970 23.448 60.838 0.640 67 1.000 75.137 184,964 0.716 11
Chemicals 0.756 39.691 24.551 62.106 1.636 41 0.636 38.128 20.101 55.652 1.486 11
Bus. Equip. 0.441 117.883 33.720 84.697 1.804 621 0.522 377.107 82.086 276.871 4.196 113
Telephone/TV 0.747 257.140 1918.496 41.958 34,626 83 1.000 1246.340 3955.716 2.806 46.343 18
Utilities 0.942 53.077 155.683 2.546 52 1.000 118.424 523.536 2.626 13
Shops 0.829 95.459 131.477 0.622 22.547 420 0.907 193.401 214.793 2.857 32.204 108
Health 0.480 51.927 78.438 42.358 11.109 383 0.519 168.962 122.988 100.745 15.219 79
Other 0.658 62.165 82.480 3.867 6.853 473 0.708 140.206 117.182 0.658 11.747 96
Os
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Table 11 sheds light on the differences between firms with and without credit 
lines. Data for the entire period, pre-crisis period, and crisis period are reported in Panels 
A, B and C, respectively. Evidence in Panel A suggests that firms with credit lines are 
more financially healthy than firms that do not have LOCs. Firms with access to credit 
lines have more investment in Capex (199.423 versus 31.160) and employment (13.998 
versus 2.502) than firms that do not. However, firms with LOCs do not have more 
investment in R&D than firms without access to credit lines. It seems that LOCs do not 
enable firms to boost growth opportunities, i.e., engage in risk-seeking R&D investment. 
This observation is supported by the fact that firms with LOCs have MTB o f 1.987, while 
firms without credit lines have a much higher MTB o f 6.677. Firms with LOCs also have 
higher ROA, cash flow, net worth, and asset tangibility than firms without credit lines. 
Somewhat surprisingly, there is no significant difference between the levels o f cash in 
firms with and without LOCs. Perhaps firms perceive that there are limits to the liquidity 
insurance that LOCs provide and therefore maintain robust levels o f cash even when they 
have access to credit lines. These differences, as shown in Panels B and C, are generally 
consistent across both pre-crisis and crisis time periods. The difference between cash 
flow o f firms with and without LOCs is 0.618 in the pre-crisis period and is even larger 
during the crisis at 1.088. Although firms with credit lines are more financially robust 
than firms without credit lines, the univariate results do not provide any indication that 
LOCs yield more protection against investment reductions during the crisis period than in 
the pre-crisis period.
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Table 11. Descriptive Statistics Firms With and Without LOCs
This table provides summary statistics for the variables used in this study for firms with and without access 
to LOCs. Panel A reports the entire sample period 1996-2000. Panels B and C report pre-crisis and crisis 
time periods, respectively. LOCTotal is the total amount o f  lines o f  credit, used and unused. LO CU sedR atio  
is L0CUsed n n e Yes is an indicator variable that takes the value o f  1 i f  the firm-year observation has access
LOCTotal J
to LOCs and 0 otherwise. Cash  is the amount o f  cash (stock). Capex  is the annual firm capital expenditures 
in plant, property, and equipment. R& D  is the annual expenditure on research and developm ent. 
Em ployment is the number o f  em ployees. ROA is ”et inLom.e CashFlow  is calculated as — EBlTDA—
A ssets A sse t s -C a sh
Liquidity is liquid assets divided by total assets. MTB is the cash-adjusted book to market ratio,
B ookV a lu eo f  E q u i ty + M a r k e tV a lu e o fE q u i ty -C a s h  . . . . A s s e t s -C a s h -L ia b i l i t i e s
---------------— — -------------------------------------- . NetW orth  is calculated a s --------------------------------.
N o n -C a s h T o ta lA s se ts  A sse ts -C a sh
A ssetTaneibility  is Tang‘bl--Asl et:\  rq js tne number o f  observations.
Tota lAsse ts
Panel A: 1996-2010
Without L OCs With LOCs
Variable N Mean M edian N Mean M edian A Mean
LOCTotal 1103 0.000 0.000 2348 285.824 50.100 285.824***
LOCUsedRatio 2348 0.262 0.115 0.262***
Line Yes 1103 0.000 0.000 2348 1.000 1.000 1.000***
Cash 1103 89.688 8.776 2348 110.647 15.063 20.959
Capex 1091 31.160 1.507 2340 199.423 14.142 168.263***
R&D 813 74.463 4.787 1393 56.884 2 .429 -17.579
Employment 1022 2.502 0.210 2.326 13.998 2.204 11.496***
ROA 1100 -0.384 -0.056 2348 -0.007 0.037 0,377***
CashFlow 1095 -0.577 0.009 2306 0.108 0.131 0.685***
Liquidity 1082 0.658 0.706 2279 0.485 0.495 -0.173***
MTB 1001 6.677 2.199 2274 1 987 1.354 -4.690***
NetWorth 1093 -0.239 0.533 2303 0.396 0.444 0.635**
AssetTangibility 1099 0.217 0 4 3 7 2307 0.325 0.273 0.108***
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Panel B: Pre-Crisis (1996-2006)
Without LOC5 With LOCs
Variable N Mean M edian N Mean M edian A Mean
LOCTotal 950 0.000 0.000 1920 263.624 46.781 263.624***
LOC UsedRatio 1920 0.270 0.140 0.270***
LineYes 950 0.000 0.000 1920 1.000 1.000 1.000***
Cash 950 78.582 7.945 1920 76.820 12.457 -1.762
Capex 940 30.276 1.572 1913 172.548 12.753 142.272***
R&D 690 67.775 4.701 1124 42.563 2.420 -25.212*
Employment 878 2.498 0.214 1907 12.980 2.000 10.482***
ROA 947 -0.345 -0.054 1920 -0.009 0.038 0.336***
CashFlow 943 -0.514 0.017 1883 0.104 0.131 0.618***
Liquidity 932 0.661 0.707 1863 0.488 0.498 -0.173***
MTB 854 6.447 2.253 1866 2.063 1.393 -4.384***
NetW orth 944 0.216 0.551 1882 0.399 0.450 0.183
AssetTangibility 947 0.221 0.142 1883 0.327 0.276 0.106***
Panel C: Crisis (2007-2010)
Without LOCs With LOCs
Variable N Mean M edian N Mean M edian A Mean
LOCTotal 134 0.000 0.000 428.000 385.415 1 12.850 0.000
LOCUsedRatio 0 428.000 0.224 0.010 0.000
LineYes 153 0.000 0.000 428.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
Cash 153 158.651 17.915 428.000 262.393 39.492 103.742*
Capex 151 36.659 0.797 427.000 319.823 25.202 283.164***
R&D 123 111.978 5.078 269.000 116.722 2.486 4.744
Employment 144 2.524 0.174 419.000 18.633 3.100 16.109***
ROA 153 -0.624 -0.070 428.000 0.003 0.035 0.627***
CashFlow 152 -0.964 -0.077 423.000 0.124 0.126 1.088***
Liquidity 150 0.639 0.702 416.000 0.470 0.477 -0.169***
MTB 147 8.012 1.891 408.000 1.639 1.242 -6.373***
NetW orth 149 -3.121 0.395 421.000 0.386 0.405 3.500*
AssetTangibility 152 0.196 0.095 424.000 0.319 0.251 0.123***
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In addition to LOC access, we also examine LOC usage during the financial 
crisis. Figure 1 shows that among firms that have access to LOCs, the amount o f total 
lines o f credit increased almost consistently throughout our study period. The finding of 
increased LOC liquidity is similar to previous literature that documents that firms have 
been holding more cash (Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009), Duchin (2010)). However,
Figure 2 demonstrates that LOC usage has been decreasing. The mean annual 
LOCUsedRatio (calculated as LOCUsed/LOCTotal) has a downward trend over the 
1996-2010 study period. Notable exceptions to the decreasing trend are increases during 
the 2000 dot com market crash and 2008 credit crisis, which likely reflect the cash 
hoarding behavior previously documented (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)). The average 
amount o f LOCs has increased, but the usage has decreased during the crisis, which may 
be another indication that firms are unable to utilize their credit lines during the crisis. It 
would be reasonable to expect that firms would increase drawdowns in an effort to 
overcome the adverse credit conditions. Hence, this reduction in drawdowms may be 
evidence o f increased bank monitoring as suggested by Jimenez, Lopez and Saurina 
(2009) and Acharya. Almeida, Ippolito and Perez (2012).
METHODOLOGY
As discussed earlier, theory predicts that credit lines should allow firms to 
minimize disruption to investment in the event o f a tightening of the credit markets 
(Campbell (1978), Hawkins (1982), Shockley and Thakor (1997), Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1998), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007)). However, empirical evidence suggests that bank
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Figure 1. Total LOC by Year
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monitoring may make LOCs more difficult to activate during a credit crisis (Lins,
Servaes and Tufano (2010), Jimenez, Lopez and Saurina (2009) and Acharya, Almeida, 
Ippolito and Perez (2012)). We investigate both LOC access and LOC drawdowns during 
the global financial crisis in an effort to resolve the differences between the theoretical 
and empirical predictions concerning the role o f credit lines during the 2008 financial 
crisis. To determine whether LOCs allow firms to mitigate the impact o f limited credit 
availability on investment, our investigation involves two stages. We first examine the 
effect o f access to LOCs on firm investment. Then we examine how credit lines are used 
during the financial crisis period.
Access to LOCs
We now proceed with the first objective o f understanding how access to credit 
lines impacts firm investment. Our main study variable for this investigation is an 
indicator variable, LineYes, that takes the value 1 if  a firm has credit lines and 0 
otherwise. To gain a better comprehension o f the characteristics that influence access to 
LOCs, we first perform a logistic regression, specified in Equation (8).
LineYest+l = /?0 + p^redi tC runcht  + p 2CashFlowt + P3AssetTangibil i ty t + 
P4NonCash Assetst + p sNetWortht + p 6MTBt + p 7CFVolt +
P8Not in S&P Indext + p 90TCt + P LAget + 2  industry  + gt (8)
CreditCrunch is an indicator variable that takes the value o f 1 if  the observation is 
in years 2007 through 2010 and 0 otherwise. This variable allows us to determine if  firms
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are more or less likely to have access to LOCs during the financial crisis. Since severe 
limitations o f credit availability happen infrequently, the recent financial crisis is an ideal 
opportunity to find answers to this empirical question. Our variables follow the 
definitions in previous literature, particularly Sufi (2009)'s seminal paper and are 
included because they have been previously shown to impact credit line usage. CashFlow 
is measured by EBITDA scaled by assets minus cash. AssetTangibility is tangible assets 
scaled by total assets. NonCashAssets is the natural logarithm of assets minus cash. We 
expect CashFlow , AssetTangibility. and NonCashAssets to positively influence LOC 
access because these variables indicate positive financial health. Firms with higher cash 
flow, asset tangibility, and assets are more likely to be approved for bank lines o f credit. 
Similarly, net worth, market to book ratio, cash flow volatility, and age are included as 
measures that may influence a firm’s financing costs. NetWorth is calculated as 
A s s e t s - c a s h - L i a b i l i t i e s  ^ C a s h - a d j u s t e d  market to book ratio, MTB, is calculated as
A sse ts -C a sh
Book va lue  of E ^ ^ a r h e t v ^ j W B h u i t y - c a s h  C a s h f l o w  v o i a t i l i t y ,  CFVol. is represented by the
Non- Cash Total  A sse ts  ' r  J
standard deviation of the four previous annual changes in cash flow divided by assets 
minus cash. LAge is the natural logarithm o f the number o f  years since the firm ’s IPO.
We also include several indicator variables to control for equity market characteristics. 
Not in S&P Index takes the value o f 1 if  the firm is not included in the S&P 500, S&P 
400, or S&P 600, and 0 otherwise. OTC takes the value o f 1 if  the firm is traded over the 
counter and 0 otherwise. We also include industry' dummies for the Fama French 12- 
industry categories from Kenneth French's website.
Next, we examine our main question: whether or not LOCs allow a firm to 
continue investment during a financial crisis. We conduct this phase o f  the study using
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OLS regressions, with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The regression 
specification follows in Equation (9) with the main variable o f  interest being the 
interaction o f the CreditCrunch and the LineYes indicator variables. To the extent that 
LOCs assist firms to mitigate the impact o f limited credit availability on investment, we 
expect a positive coefficient, demonstrating that firms with access to credit lines are more 
likely to invest during a financial crisis.
Investmentt+1 = y0 + Yi^izet + y2Casht+ y3LineYest + y4Cash * LineYest + 
ysCreditCruncht + y6CreditCrunch * LineYest+  y 7Hedget + Y industry  +
Vt (9)
We are interested in a firm’s ability to invest in three types o f  corporate 
investment: capital expenditures, research and development (R&D), and employment. 
Accordingly, the Investment variable o f Equation (9) takes the value o f capital 
expenditures, R&D, and employment in separate models. This regression specification 
controls for firm size and cash. Size is the natural logarithm o f the firm ’s total assets.
Cash is the annual amount o f cash. The main variable of interest in this regression is the 
interaction o f the CreditCrunch and the LineYes indicator variables. We expect a positive 
coefficient, demonstrating that firms with access to credit lines are more able to invest 
during a financial crisis. We also include the Hedge indicator variable that takes the value 
o f 1 if the firm hedges its credit lines and 0 otherwise, as Berrospide, Meisenzahl and 
Sullivan (2012) find that hedging influences LOC usage.
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Similarly, we examine annual changes by substituting changes in investment for 
the dependent variable. Since investment levels may be fairly consistent over time, 
changes in investment may allow us to more accurately assess changes in investment 
policy. Once again, we expect that the interaction o f CreditCrunch and LineYes will be 
positively related to changes in investment in these models.
LOC drawdowns
We now move on to the next objective o f our study that examines LOC 
drawdowns, rather than access. Our hand-collected data allows us the unique opportunity 
to discern LOC usage during a financial crisis. As with the access investigation, we begin 
with a logistic regression analysis to examine the determinants of LOC usage. Since our 
focus is on LOC usage, we only include firms that have access to credit lines in this 
section of the study. The logistic regression is specified in Equation (10).
HiLOCt+1 = +  /?!CreditCruncht 4- (32CashFlowt + ^Asse tT angib i l i ty  t
+ faNonCash Asse ts t +  p sNetWortht + f3eMTBt + p 7CFVolt 
+ /38Not in S&P Indext + p 9OTCt + /310LAget + (ilxHedget
+ (312BondRatet + p l3CommPapert + ^  industry  +  rjt
(10)
HiLOC is an indicator variable that takes the value o f 1 if  the firm has a LOCUsedRatio 
(LOCUsed/LOC Total) greater than the median and 0 otherwise. Previous literature 
suggests that firms exercised LOCs more extensively during the financial crisis (Ivashina 
and Scharfstein (2010)). Accordingly, a positive relationship between CreditCrunch and
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HiLOC  may be expected. However, the empirical literature also finds that covenants may 
prohibit firms from using their credit lines in hard financial times, which would indicate a 
negative relationship between CreditCrunch and HiLOC  (Sufi (2009)). Since the 
literature provides indications o f  both a positive and negative coefficient on 
CreditCrunch, the prediction o f the coefficient is an empirical matter that will be resolved 
by the analysis. We also regress the HiLOC  dummy on other variables previously shown 
to have an impact on liquidity decisions. Hedge is an indicator variable that takes the 
value o f 1 if the firm hedges its LOC (either voluntarily or by mandate), and 0 otherwise. 
BondRate and CommPaper are indicator variables that take the value o f 1 if  the firm has 
a bond rating or access to commercial paper, respectively. Since previous literature 
indicates that high LOC users may be financially constrained, we expect a negative 
coefficient on Cash Flow. NetWorth, MTB, BondRate, and CommPaper.
We then examine the effect o f LOC usage, rather than access to LOCs, on 
corporate investment during the financial crisis. In contrast to the specification in 
Equation (9), where we examine the effect o f having credit lines on investment, the 
following models allow us to determine whether or not the liquidity insurance benefits of 
LOCs are dependent on the degree o f LOC usage. Again, we investigate three measures 
o f investment: capital expenditures, research and development, and employment in the 
specification listed in Equation (11).
Investmentt+1 = y0 + y i Sizet + y2Casht+  y3HiLOCt + y4Cash * HiLOCt + 
y5CreditCruncht + y6CreditCrunch * HiLOCt +  y 7Hedget + 2  industry  + r]t (11)
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Since bank financing is limited during the credit crisis, we expect less investment 
during the crisis than in more healthy economic environments. Consequently, we 
anticipate a negative coefficient on both CreditCrunch and HiLOC  indicator variables.
We also expect that the more financially constrained high LOC users will have a small 
amount o f additional credit line liquidity to utilize. Since they have exhausted a 
significant portion of their LOCs, the remaining LOC credit will have little, if  any impact 
on investment.
RESULTS
We now report the results on the effectiveness o f LOCs to mitigate the impact o f 
limited credit availability on investment during the financial crisis. Recall that theory 
predicts that LOCs act as liquidity insurance, enabling firms to invest when external 
liquidity may be difficult to acquire. The financial crisis provides an ideal exogenous 
event to examine this prediction. We first ascertain which firm characteristics contribute 
to a firm’s ability to obtain LOCs. We then examine the relation between corporate 
investment and LOCs to see if lines o f credit are able to fulfill their liquidity insurance 
function during this financial crisis.
Determinants o f  access to LOCs
We begin our multivariate analysis by investigating the factors that allow a firm 
to have LOCs. That is, what characteristics contribute to the likelihood o f a firm having 
access to credit lines. To accomplish this aim, we utilize logistic regression where the 
indicator variable, LineYes, is regressed on credit environment, firm characteristics, and
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firm financial health. These results are presented in Table 12. Our main result is that the 
coefficient o f CreditCrunch is not significant. This means that firms are equally likely to 
have LOCs before and during the financial crisis. The finding that the crisis did not 
influence firms’ access to LOCs is somewhat surprising. We would expect that firms 
would seek access to additional credit lines during a period o f credit market instability, 
resulting in a positive relationship between CreditCrunch and LineYes. Our results 
suggest that banks may have been reluctant to supply additional LOCs during the crisis. 
Likewise, the absence o f a negative relationship between CreditCrunch and LineYes is 
consistent with Berrospide, Meisenzahl and Sullivan (2012)’s finding that LOCs were 
rarely canceled during the crisis. On the supply side o f LOCs, this result suggests that 
financial institutions do not reduce the availability o f  LOCs during economic downturns, 
a finding consistent with Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010). Since the credit environment 
does not significantly influence whether or not firms have LOCs, it is possible that LOCs 
may be able to provide a source o f liquidity during credit-constrained periods o f time, as 
the theoretical literature predicts. However, this is preliminary evidence. We need to 
examine the firms’ investments to fully test the hypothesis that the liquidity insurance
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Table 12. Determinants of Having Credit Line (1996-2010)
This table reports results o f  logistic regression o f  LineYes on independent variables. LineYes is an indicator 
variable that takes the value o f  1 if the firm-year observation has access to LOCs and 0 otherwise. 
CreditCrunch  is an indicator variable that takes the value o f  1 if  the observation is in years 2007-2010  and
0 otherwise. CashFlow  is calculated as — — — -— . AssetTangibility  is ~— ~ ~  Assets. NonCashAssets  is
A sse ts -C a sh  ' To ta lAsse ts
calculated as Ln(A ssets — Cash). NetW orth  is calculated as '4- - t5 Cas~~ kiabllltles js the cash-adjusted
A sse ts -C a sh
, , , B o o k V a lu e o fE q u i ty + M a r k e tV a lu e o fE u u i ty -C a s h  t » «
book to market ratio ,--------------------------------------------------------------- . LF V ol, cashflow volatility, is theN o n -C a s h T o ta lA s se ts
standard deviation o f  the previous four annual changes in cash flow  scaled by (Total Assets-Cash). LAge is 
the natural logarithm o f  the number o f  years since IPO. Not in S&P Index takes the value o f 1 if 
the firm is not included in the S&P 500, S&P 400, or S&P 600. and 0 otherwise. OTC  
takes the value o f 1 if the firm is traded over the counter and 0 otherwise Industry dummies 
are calculated using the Fama French 12 industry SIC codes.
Logistic Regression. Probab 'litv L ine Yes -  !
Param eter Estimate W ald Chi-Square Pr  > ChiSq
Intercept -0.6752 4.9671 0.0258
CreditCrunch -0.1881 2.1147 0.1459
CashFlow 0.7295 19.1987 <.0001
AssetTangibility 0.4315 3.0495 0.0808
N onCashA ssets 0.2664 67.0854 <0001
NetW orth -0.1634 23.2740 <0001
MTB -0.0530 11.2942 0.0008
CFVol -0.3029 2 .25 ' 6 0.1335
Not In S& P Index 0.0958 0.4854 0 4860
OTC -0.1686 1.4089 0.2352
LAge 0.1659 10.420! 0.0012
Industry Dummies yes
O bservations 3101
Likelihood Ratio 893.5210 <0001
Score 775.3498 <0001
Wald 530.1712 <0001
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property o f LOCs enables firms to mitigate the impact o f limited credit availability on 
investment.
Not surprisingly, we also find that firms with a higher level o f financial health are 
more likely to have LOCs. CashFlow, AssetTangibility. NonCashAssets, and LAge are all 
positively related to LineYes. We also find that firms with a higher net worth and MTB 
are less likely to have LOCs. This may stem from the fact that these firms are more 
marketable and may have access to other types financing, such as issuing equity and term 
loans. The coefficients o f CFVol, Not In S&P Index, and OTC  are insignificant, 
suggesting that stock market factors may be unrelated to LOC access. But our main 
takeaway from Table 12 is that firms have access to LOCs in both the pre-crisis and crisis 
periods.
Investment and access to LOCs
Having examined the determinant characteristics o f firms possessing access to 
LOCs, we now move on to assess the impact of LOC access on corporate investment 
during a crisis. Table 13 reports these results. The evidence shows that firms with LOCs 
invest less in Capex than firms that do not. The negative coefficient o f  the LineYes 
indicator variable for both Capex and Employment models suggests that LOCs do not 
assist firms in funding their corporate investment. On the contrary, firms with LOCs tend 
to invest less or direct LOCs into other corporate needs rather than retain or enhance their 
growth options. Since there is no statistically significant relationship between LineYes 
and R&D investment, it seems that these firms may have exhausted their growth options. 
However, the Cash and the Cash*LineYes variables enter the regressions with positive 
and significant coefficients suggesting that firms rely on internally generated cash flows
8 0
to finance their investments and that LOCs for these firms (i.e., cash-rich firms with 
LOCs) exert a positive influence on investment, especially on Capex and Employment. 
This finding is consistent with both Sufi (2009) and Campello, Giambona, Graham and 
Harvey (2011). Interestingly, the LOC variables have an insignificant association with 
R&D spending indicating that growth seeking investments are not dependent on access to 
credit lines. On the contrary, the positive and significant influence Cash is exerting on 
R&D suggests that this type o f investment is funded by internally-generated cash flows.
The negative CreditCrunch coefficient indicates that the financial crisis, as 
expected, had a contractionary influence on corporate investment. The coefficient o f  the 
interaction term, CreditCrunch *Line Yes. is also negative (although significant only at the 
10% level). This result suggests that firms with LOCs not only failed to reverse the 
decreasing investment trend during the crisis period, but may have experienced an even 
greater investment deterioration than firms without LOCs, especially Capex. This finding 
is consistent with the suggestion o f Lins, Servaes and Tufano (2010) that LOCs may be 
difficult to deploy during economic upheavals. Hence, the theoretical prediction that lines 
o f credit provide liquidity insurance that helps firms maintain value-enhancing corporate 
investment when other forms o f liquidity are limited (Campbell (1978), Hawkins (1982), 
Shockley and Thakor (1997), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), DeMarzo and Fishman 
(2007)) fails to gain support in the data. Our results thus far seem to be more in line with 
the recent empirical literature, which casts doubts on the effectiveness o f LOCs as 
liquidity insurance. Having examined the impact o f LOC access on the level o f corporate
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Table 13. Influence of LOC Access on Corporate Investment (1996-2010)
This table provides OLS regression results based on the Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey (2011) 
specification. Dependent variables are Capex, R&D, and Employment in separate models. C apex  is the 
annual firm capital expenditures in plant, property, and equipment. R & D  is the annual expenditure on 
Research and Development. Em pl is the number o f  em ployees. Size  is the natural logarithm o f  the firm ’s 
total assets. Cash  is the annual amount o f  cash (stock). LineYes is an indicator variable that takes the value 
o f  1 if the firm-year observation has access to LOCs and 0 otherwise. CreditCrunch  is an indicator variable 
that takes the value o f  1 i f  the observation is in years 2007-2010 and 0 otherwise. H edge takes the value o f  
1 if the firm reported hedging its LOCs and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies are calculated using the Fama 
French 12 industry SIC codes. T-statistics are calculated with heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. ***, **, 
* are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
D ependent Variable
Param eter C a p ex t+ i R8cDl+ i E m pl t+i
Intercept -285. i0*** -295.93*** -27.44* -32.67** -20.58*** -20.79***
( -5 .13) (-5.26) ( - 1.88) (-2 .01) (-10.90) (-10.97)
Size 74.00*** 74,24*** 6.54 6.68 5 ^9*** 5.70***
(5.95) (5.96) ( 1. 12) (1.14) (13.56) (13.57)
Cash 0.06* 0.06* 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.00 0.00
( l  .82) (1.74) (3.65) (3.65) (0-19) (0.14)
LineYes -78 73*** -65.00*** -28.20 -21.45 -1.93** - 1.66*
(-4.37) (-3.36) (-1.34) ( - 1. 10) (-2.23) (-1 .80)
Cash* LineYes I i3*** | 0.13 0.13 0.03*** 0.03***
(4.83) (4.86) (0 .68 ) (0.71) (4-45) (4 .47)
CreditCrunch -91.81 21.61 -38.35** 6.78 -3.59** -1.40
(-1.63) ( 1.01) (-2 .17) (0.17) (-2.04) (-0 .90)
CreditCrunch * LineYes -150.63* -64.87 -2.91
(-1.92) (-1.45) (-1.06)
Hedge -313.76*** -310.14*** -38.86* -36.18 -3.80 -3.74
(-2.63) (-2-59) (-1-73) (-1.64) (-0.83) (-0.82)
Industry Dummies ves yes ves yes yes yes
Observations 3131 3131 2022 2022 3093 3093
Adj R-Squared 0.3549 0.3551 0.6875 0.6881 0.3545 0.3544
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investment, we now turn our attention to the influence access to credit lines has on 
changes in investment.
Investment changes and access to LOCs
In this section we report new regression results with specifications that are similar 
to the previous analysis. However in these regressions, the dependent variables are 
changes in Capex, R&D, and employment investment. Table 14 reports these results. 
Since firms may maintain the same level o f investment year after year, this specification 
allows to us to see how LOC access affects changes in investment policy. As in the 
previous analysis in Table 12, we find a negative coefficient on LineYes in the Capex 
model. This result suggests that firms with access to LOCs reduced spending in capital 
expenditures. When the CreditCrunch*LineYes variable enters the model with a negative 
coefficient, LineYes becomes insignificant, indicating that the reduction in Capex 
investment occurs during the crisis period. Likewise, the CreditCrunch*LineYes variable 
is negative and significant for the Employment model, which suggests that LOCs do not 
allow firms to maintain their workforces during a poor economic climate. Hence, we find 
further evidence that LOCs are not able to be successfully deployed for investment 
during the financial crisis. On the contrary, firms with LOCs reduced both Capex and 
Employment investment. The coefficient on the Hedge indicator variable is insignificant 
for Capex and Employment, but negative in the R&D model which again suggests that 
LOC hedging does not assist firms in increasing investment. Jointly the evidence in 
Tables 13 and 14 suggest that simply having access to LOCs does not provide insurance
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Table 14. Influence of LOC Access on Changes in Investment (1996-2010)
This table provides OLS regression results based on the Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey (2011) 
specification. Dependent variables are annual changes in Capex, R&D, and Employment in separate 
models. Capex  is the annual firm capital expenditures in plant, property, and equipment. R& D  is the annual 
expenditure on Research and Development. Empl is the number o f  em ployees. Size  is the natural logarithm 
o f  the firm’s total assets. Cash  is the annual amount o f  cash (stock). LineYes is an indicator variable that 
takes the value o f  1 if  the firm-year observation has access to LOCs and 0 otherwise. CreditCrunch  is an 
indicator variable that takes the value o f  1 if the observation is in years 2007-2010 and 0 otherwise. H edge 
takes the value o f  1 if  the firm reported hedging its LOCs and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies are calculated 
using the Fama French 12 industry' SIC codes. T-statistics are calculated with heteroskedasticity-consistent 
errors. ***, **, * are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
D ependen t Variable
P aram eter A C ap e*t+i AR8iDt+i A E m p lt+ -[
Intercept -19.86 -24.12 -15.00** -14.46** 0.10 0.05
(-1.34) (-1.54) (-2.33) (-2 .21) (0.32) (0 .14)
Size 6.48* 6.58* 4.12** 4.11** 0.05 0.05
( 1.88) (1.90) (2.27) (2.25) (0.73) (0 .75)
Cash l © © * -0 . 10* 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00
(-1.65) (-1.70) (0.71) (0.71) ( 1. 12) (1 .09)
Line Fes -10.77* -5.39 -3.27 -3.96 0.01 0.08
(-1 79) (-0.99) (-0.65) (-0.84) (0.08) (0.74)
Cash*LineYes 0.1 1 0 . 11 * -0.04 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00
(1.64) (1.71) (-0.65) (-0.65) (-0.53) (-0 .48)
CreditCrunch -33.87*** 10.44 -5.82 -10.34 -0 .66*** -0.11
(-3 .0 !) (1.15) (-0 .88) (-1.14) (-3.00) (-1.08)
C reditC  ru nc’n *Ltne Yes -58.84*** 6.50 -0.73**
(-3.06) (0 .5 !) (-2.32)
H edge -14.54 -13.08 -5.90* -6.17** 1.01 1.03
(-0.45) (-0.41) ( - 1.86) (-1.98) (1.07) (1.08)
Industry Dummies yes ves yes yes yes yes
O bservations 3122 3122 1995 1995 3036 3036
A dj R -Squared 0.0238 0.0248 0.0335 0.0332 0.0070 0.0072
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against decreases in investment during both normal credit market conditions and the 
recent financial crisis, an extremely tight credit market environment15. This surprising 
result is in contrast to the theoretical predictions suggesting LOCs provide liquidity 
insurance to help firms smooth investment when credit is scarce or costly (Campbell 
(1978), Hawkins (1982), Shockley and Thakor (1997), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), 
DeMarzo and Fishman (2007)). We investigate this matter further by looking at LOC 
usage rather than simple access in the following sections.
Investment and LOC usage
We next draw our attention to the effect that LOC usage has on corporate 
investment. The literature largely focuses on the advantages and consequences o f  having 
access to credit lines. LOC usage, or drawdowns, has been all but ignored. The 
theoretical literature implies that LOCs allow firms to protect themselves from 
investment declines. LOCs provide access to additional liquidity that helps firms to 
smooth cash flows and maintain investment. However, we expect that firms that draw 
down their credit lines extensively (high LOC users) will have limited unused credit to 
boost investment. Therefore, it is likely that LOCs will possess effective liquidity 
insurance properties only for firms which do not extensively draw down their credit lines 
(low LOC users).
Before we look at the effect o f LOCs on investment, we first examine the 
characteristics that influence LOC usage in an effort to understand what drives some 
firms to use LOCs more extensively than others. Firms that have access to credit lines
15 Results consistent with Tables 13 and 14 were obtained when Operating Expenses (Selling, General, and 
Administrative and Cost o f  Goods Sold) were substituted for the dependent variable. Results are available 
upon request.
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may choose to employ them in either an aggressive or conservative manner. Firms that 
maintain aggressive liquidity policies are more likely to use a high percentage o f 
available credit lines. As a result these high LOC users may be unable to employ LOCs to 
invest when credit markets tighten. On the other hand, firms that adopt more conservative 
liquidity policies, reserving unused LOCs for future investment, may be better situated to 
continue value-enhancing investment during a financial crisis. To examine how LOC 
usage is linked to corporate investment, we use an indicator variable, HiLOC , which 
takes the value o f 1 when a firm uses a higher than median percentage o f its LOCs and 0 
otherwise.
Table 15 reports the determinants o f  LOC usage, using logistic regression of 
HiLOC on firm characteristics. The evidence shows that firms are less likely to use a high 
amount o f  their LOCs during the crisis than before the crisis. This may be due to bank 
monitoring as suggested by Jimenez, Lopez and Saurina (2009) and Acharya, Almeida, 
Ippolito and Perez (2012). We also find that high LOC users have lower cash flow, net 
worth and market to book. They also have less access to equity markets, as seen by the 
positive coefficients on the Not in S&P Index and OTC  indicator variables. High LOC 
users are less likely to have a bond rating or access to commercial paper. Consistent with 
previous literature, the results in Table 15 suggest that high LOC users may be financially 
constrained. We also find a positive coefficient on the Hedge dummy, indicating that 
firms that hedge their credit lines tend to use the LOCs more. This finding is consistent 
with Disatnik, Duchin and Schmidt (2009) and Berrospide, Meisenzahl and Sullivan 
(2012). In sum, we find evidence that high LOC users are financially constrained with
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Table 15. Determinants of High LOC Usage (1996-2010)
This table reports results o f  logistic regression o f  H iLOC  on independent variables. H iLO C  takes the value 
o f  1 if the firm has a LOCUsedRatio higher than the median and 0 otherwise. CreditC runch  is an indicator 
variable that takes the value o f  1 if the observation is in years 2007-2010 and 0 otherwise. CashFlow  is 
calculated as —kBI? - -— . AssetTangibility is T-™$iB— - sets-. NonCashAssets is calculated as L n(A ssets —
A sse ts -C a sh  T o ta lA sse ts
Cash). NetW orth  is calculated as Ass--ts   — — — . MTB is the cash-adjusted book to market ratio,
'  A sse ts -C ash
B o o k V a lu e o fE q u i ty + M a r k e tV a lu e o fE q u i ty -C a s h  , Lri  , . . .  ♦ « . , , , . . r .,
---------------— — --------------------------------------- . CFVol, cashflow  volatility, is the standard deviation of the
N o n -C a s h T o ta lA s se ts
previous four annual changes in cash flow  scaled by (Total Assets-Cash). LAge is the natural logarithm o f  
the number o f  years since IPO. H edge takes the value o f  1 if  the firm reported hedging its LOCs and 0 
otherwise. Not in S& P Index takes the value o f  1 if  the firm is not included in the S&P 500, S&P 400, or 
S&P 600, and 0 otherw ise. OTC  takes the value o f  I if  the firm is traded over the counter and 0 otherwise. 
Indicator variables indicating i f  the firm has a bond rating and access commercial paper are also included.
Logistic Regression: Probability HiLOC /
Param eter Estimate
W ald Chi- 
Square Pr >  ChiSq
Intercept 0.9849 7.7035 0.0055
CreditCrunch -0.2215 3.3147 0.0687
CashFlow -1.0208 13.9921 0.0002
AssetTangibility 0.5796 5.8647 0.0154
NonCashAssets 0.0002 0.0000 0.9960
NetWorth -0.3070 9.2398 0.0024
MTB -0.1185 15.6167 <.0001
CFVol -3.8394 25.3792 <.0001
Not In S& P Index 0 3401 7.4435 0.0064
OTC 0 3885 5.9369 0.0148
LAge -0.1838 14.3757 0.0001
Hedge 0.8335 8.5580 0.0034
BondRate -0.2712. 3.5990 0.0578
Com m Paper -0.9583 19.1048 <.0001
Industry’ Dummies yes
Observations 2189
Likelihood Ratio 279.9746 <.0001
Score 240.4340 <.0001
Wald 217 9914 <0001
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limited access to external funding. As such, these high LOC users may actually be 
impacted less by the financial crisis than low LOC users, since they likely had less 
involvement in credit markets.
Next, we regress three measure o f  investment (Capex, R&D, and Employment) on 
LOC and control variables to determine if LOC usage has an effect on a firm ’s ability to 
successfully utilize the liquidity insurance qualities o f  credit lines. Table 16 reports the 
results. We expect that if  LOCs do provide liquidity insurance during the crisis, then the 
effect would only reveal itself with low LOC users. The negative and highly significant 
coefficients on HiLOC  indicate high LOC users invest less in Capex and employment 
than low LOC users. However, the coefficient on CreditCrunch*HiLOC  is not 
significantly different from zero for Capex, R&D and employment models. Hence, the 
financially constrained High LOC users invest less than low LOC users, regardless o f  the 
credit environment. It seems that LOCs do not allow high users to invest more before or 
during the crisis. We also find that the coefficients o f LOCTotal and Cash*LOC Total are 
positive and significant at the 1% level for Capex. This result shows that LOCs in 
association with cash do help firms invest. It also provides support for the Campello, 
Giambona, Graham and Harvey (2011) assertion that the combination o f credit lines and 
cash help increase investment. In all, our results show that credit lines may help low LOC 
users invest, but they do not provide any special assistance or protection during the crisis.
Table 16. Influence of High LOC Usage on Corporate Investment (1996-2010)
This table provides OLS regression results based on the Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey (2011) specification. Dependent variables are Capex, R&D, 
and Employment in separate models. Capex is the annual firm capital expenditures in plant, property, and equipment. R&D  is the annual expenditure on Research 
and Development. Empl is the number o f  employees. Size is the natural logarithm o f  the firm’s total assets. Cash is the annual amount o f  cash (stock). 
CreditCrunch  is an indicator variable that takes the value o f  I if  the observation is in years 2007-2010 and 0 otherwise. LOCTotal is the total amount o f  lines o f  
credit, used and unused. HiLOC  takes the value o f  1 if the firm has a LOCUsedRatio higher than the median and 0 otherwise. Hedge takes the value o f  1 if the 
firm reported hedging its LOCs and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies are calculated using the Fama French 12 industry SIC codes. T-statistics are calculated with
heteroskedastieity-consistent errors. *** ** *are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Parameter _____________ ___  CapextjL, _  _ Emplt+1
Intercept 219.53*** 218.89*** 206.02*** -3.23 -4.49 -4.83 -6.29** -6.30** -6.44**
(3.40) (3.39) (3.24) (-0.13) (-0.18) (-0 .20) (-2.39) (-2.39) (-2.44)
Size -18.38 -18.35 -15.32 -4.54 -4.54 -4.32 7 37*** 2 37*** 2.41***
( - 1.22) ( - 1.22) ( - 1.02) (-0.75) (-0.75) (-0.71) (4.08) (4.09) (4.15)
Cash -0.35 -0.35 -0.36 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.63*** 0 .02*** 0 .02*** 0 .02***
(-1.49) (-1.49) (-1.53) (3.77) (3.77) (3.76) (2.73) (2.74) (2.72)
LOCTotal 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(6.39) (6.39) (6.40) (1.43) (1.45) (1.47) (7.53) (7.51) (7.50)
Cash* LOCTotal 0 .00*** 0 .00*** 0 .00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00* -0 .00* -0 .00*
(3.65) (3.65) (3 66) (1 38) (1.38) (1 3 8 ) (-1.87) (-1.87) (-1-87)
CreditCrunch -62.17 -58.53 -52.08 -54.26*** -46.10* -45.00 -3.25* -3.15 -3.07
( - 1.21) (-0 .68) (-0.60) (-2.71) (-1.67) (-1.62) (-1.71) ( - 1.00) (-0.98)
HiLOC -194.50*** -193.43*** -186.96*** 1.79 4.34 4.76 -4 92*** -4.89*** -4.81***
(-5.97) (-5.55) (-5.49) (0 .20) (0.50) (0.55) (-5.32) (-4.78) (-4.70)
CreditCrunch* HiLOC -8.02 -8.44 -18.51 -18.97 -0.24 -0.25
(-0.08) (-0.08) (-0.49) (-0.50) (-0.06) (-0.07)
Hedge -307.25***
(-3.22)
-28.33
( - 1. 12)
-3.41
(-1.37)
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2150 2150 2150 1287 1287 1287 2134 2134 2134
Ad/ R-Squared 0.6887 0.6886 0.6902 0 6791 0.6789 0.6789 0.5755 0.5753 0.5753
Table 17. Influence of High LOC Usage on Changes in Corporate Investment (1996-2010)
This table provides OLS regression results based on the Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey (2011) specification. Dependent variables are annual changes 
in Capex, R&D, and Employment in separate models. Capex is the annual firm capital expenditures in plant, property, and equipment. R&D  is the annual 
expenditure on Research and Development. Empl is the number o f  employees. Size is the natural logarithm o f the firm’s total assets. Cash  is the annual amount 
o f cash (stock). CreditCrunch is an indicator variable that takes the value o f  1 if the observation is in years 2007-2010 and 0 otherwise. LOCTotal is the total 
amount o f  lines o f  credit, used and unused. HiLOC  takes the value o f  1 if the firm has a LOCusedRatio higher than the median and 0 otherwise. Hedge takes the 
value o f  1 if  the firm reported hedging its LOCs and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies are calculated using the Fama French 12 industry SIC codes. T-statistics are
calculated with heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. 3§e $  1(5 sfc a|e $ are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Parameter A Capext+l A R8iD[+] i^Enxplf 4. ^
Intercept 0.03 2.32 1.81 -19.77 -1953 -19.57 0.18 0.24 0.29
(0 .00) (0.09) (0.07) (-1.38) (-1.37) (-1.37) (0.46) (0 6 1 ) (0.70)
Size 2.38 2.27 2.38 5.13 5.13 5.16 0.09 0.09 0.08
(0.49) (0.47) (0.50) (1.29) (1.29) (1.29) (1.28) (1.23) (1.09)
Cash 0.06 0.06 0.06 0 04 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
( 1. 12) (1.13) ( 112 ) (-0.35) (-0.35) (-0.35) (1.05) (1.07) ( 1. 11)
LOCTotal 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 •0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (-0.19) (-0 .20) (-0 .20) (-0.46) (-0.481 (-0.46)
Cash* LOCTotal -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0 00
(-1.53) (-1.52) (-1.52) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (-1.23) ( - 1.2 1 ) (-L 23)
CreditCrunch -48.94*** -61.90*** -61.65*** -4.36 -5.88 -5.70 -0 .88*** _j t }*** -1 75***
(-3.52) (-2 .66) (-2.69) (-0.55) (-0.64) (-0.61) (-3.06) (-2.82) (-2.89)
HiLOC -22.09 -25.90 -25.65* -6.79* -7.27* -7.21* -0.32 -0.42 -0.45
(-1.57) (-1-61) (-1.65) (-1.75) (-1.81) (-1.82) (-1.29) (-1.48) (-1.60)
CreditCrunch* HiLOC 28.58 28.55 3.48 3.42 0.78 0.79
(1.13) (1.13) (0.72) (0.70) (1.52) (1.54)
Hedge -11.40 -4.69 1.08
(-0.35) (-0.90) ( 1. 10)
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 
Adj R-Squared
2146
0.0205
2146
0.0204
2146
0.0200
1269
0.0126
1269
0.0119
1269
0.0112
2127
0.0084
2127
0.0085
2127
0.0092
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For changes in investment, we find that the credit crisis was the single most 
important factor on firms’ decreased investment in capital expenditures and employment. 
Table 17 shows that the coefficient of CreditCrunch is negative and significant at the 1% 
level in both capital investment and employment models. However, the 
CreditCrunch*HiLOC  term is not significant in any o f the models. These results may be 
explained by the fact that high LOC users do not have access to external funding in good 
and bad times. They have limited access to both equity and bond financing and are less 
likely to have bond ratings or commercial paper programs. Therefore, it seems that the 
financial crisis did not represent a change in credit environment for high LOC users.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we examine whether credit lines possess liquidity insurance 
properties that allow firms to invest during periods o f limited credit availability. The 
financial crisis that peaked in 2008 is an exogenous event, providing an opportunity to 
assess the impact o f lines o f credit on corporate investment during a period o f severe 
economic instability. With a unique dataset that includes bank lines o f  credit, LOC 
drawdowns, and hedging data, we examine the relation between credit line usage and 
corporate investment (Capex, employment, and R&D). Our results provide strong 
evidence that LOCs on their own do not enhance a firm's ability to maintain its 
investment during a crisis. This finding calls into question the theoretical view that LOCs 
provide liquidity insurance that assist firms invest during harsh economic times and tight 
credit conditions (Campbell (1978), Hawkins (1982), Shockley and Thakor (1997), 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007)). However, we do find that
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LOCs enable firms to engage in more corporate investment than they would be able to 
with cash alone. Interestingly, this interactive effect is observed across both pre-crisis and 
crisis periods.
Our findings tend to contradict the predictions of theoretical literature that credit 
lines assist firms to avoid decreases in investment during credit-constrained economic 
environments. Our empirical evidence is more consistent with studies suggesting that 
bank monitoring limits the ability o f firms to deploy credit lines. In all, our research 
suggests that LOCs have not provided effective liquidity insurance during the 2008 
financial crisis.
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CHAPTER III
DID THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS IMPACT INTEGRATION BETWEEN THE 
REAL ESTATE AND STOCK MARKETS?
INTRODUCTION
Previous studies illustrate that Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are 
important because they allow investors to diversify into real estate (Goetzmann and 
Ibbotson (1990)). Specifically, studies find that REITs may be able to help investors 
smooth market cycles. Glascock, Michayluk and Neuhauser (2004) examine the reaction 
o f equity REITs (EREITs) and the stock market in the days surrounding the October 1997 
crash. They document that after the market crash, REIT prices declined less than non- 
REIT stocks. They also find that the bid-ask spreads o f  non-REIT stocks increased after 
the crash, whereas REIT bid-ask spreads decreased. They conclude that REITs are good 
defensive stocks. However, the October 1997 crash was largely caused by automated 
stock market program trading. But what happens when market turmoil is related to real 
estate? Are REITs still good defensive stocks? To address these questions, we examine 
the interaction among the returns o f the stock market proxy (CRSP Value-Weighted 
Index) and returns from the equity REIT (EREIT) and mortgage REIT (MREIT) indices 
produced by FTSE/NAREIT. In addition to securitized REITs, we also examine 
estimated daily FTSE/NAREIT PurePlay transaction-based indices at the aggregate 
return level and by geographic/property type16. These analyses provide additional insight 
since they may more accurately reflect the values o f the underlying commercial property.
16 This analysis is made possible by the creation o f  new daily transaction-based commercial real estate 
indices created by David Geltner and Brad Case, who we thank for their early release for this study.
Market integration is framed in the literature in two main ways. Some studies 
define market integration as the degree to which systematic risk is equally priced in each 
market (Liu, Hartzell, Greig and Grissom (1990), Bekaert and Harvey (1995), Chen and 
Knez (1995), and Ling and Naranjo (1999)). According to this definition, if the real estate 
market and the stock market are integrated, then only stock market systematic risk (and 
not real estate market systematic risk) is priced in both the real estate and stock markets 
(Liu, Hartzell, Greig and Grissom (1990)). The second definition o f integration is the 
degree to which the market returns move together. Studies that examine market 
integration using the co-movement definition include Karolyi and Stulz (1996), Glascock, 
Lu and So (2000), Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2009), and Simon and Ng (2009). 
Although clearly related, the two definitions lead to different empirical methodologies. 
The present study uses the second definition o f market integration. By examining the 
relationship between stock market returns and commercial real estate market returns 
before and after the 2008 financial crisis, we are able to assess how the crisis affected the 
markets' degree o f integration.
Previous studies show that return spillovers between the stock market and REITs 
are unidirectional - the stock market influences EREIT returns, but EREIT returns do not 
influence the stock market returns (Subrahmanyam (2007)). Accordingly, we expect that 
prior to the 2008 financial crash both MREITs and EREITs will have little or no 
influence on the stock market. However, because issues relating to real estate (sub-prime 
mortgage loans) are widely blamed for precipitating the financial crisis, we expect that 
the both MREIT and EREIT returns will influence the stock market returns after the 
crisis. The intuition behind this argument is demonstrated by making a comparison to
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international diversification. Buying international stocks may help reduce reliance on the 
U.S. stock market, especially during times o f crisis. It may smooth returns for investors 
desiring less volatility (Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1990)). In such cases, buying European 
stock indices may be recommended to increase diversification. However, when the 
source o f the uncertainty in the U.S. stock market can be traced to uncertainty 
surrounding the solvency o f several European nations, then the diversification effects of 
buying the European index may be limited. Subrahmanyam (2007) suggests that one 
reason REITs are adept at smoothing portfolio returns is that during market downturns, 
investors tend to move their money to the real estate market in search o f  more stability. If 
investors seek safe markets in times o f crisis, then investors may not have fled to the real 
estate market after the 2008 crisis, thereby reducing the balancing nature o f the real estate 
investment and increasing the level o f integration.
Consistent with previous research, we find that the stock market influences REITs 
prior to the 2008 crisis, and we find no evidence that MREITs or ERElTs influence the 
greater stock market returns. Using Granger-causality, vector autoregression (VAR) and 
state space models, we find that after the 2008 crisis the relationship changed; the 
relationship is no longer unidirectional. Instead, MREIT and EREIT returns influence 
stock market returns in addition to the stock market returns influencing REIT returns. Our 
results are robust to alternate dates specified for the financial crisis. We also find that 
estimated transaction-based REIT returns influence stock market returns and that some 
geographic/property type (pure play) indices may be less integrated with the stock 
market, particularly after a crisis.
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Although this study uses the co-movement definition of market integration, our 
results support recent studies that find evidence o f increased systematic risk in REITs. 
Chatrath, Liang and McIntosh (2000) suggest that REITs have larger betas during 
economic downturns than during times o f market expansion. Accordingly, it is not 
surprising that recent evidence from the 2008 financial crisis shows that REIT systematic 
risk is unusually high ((Devaney (2012), Devos. Ong, Spieler and Tsang (2012)). In fact, 
Devos, Ong, Spieler and Tsang (2012) report that average REIT betas increased from 
0.65 before the crisis to 1.58 after the crisis. Our finding o f increased integration between 
the real estate and stock markets is consistent with this increased level o f systematic risk.
We add to the real estate and portfolio management literature in three main ways. 
This is the first study to find evidence o f REIT returns influencing stock market returns. 
Previous studies have maintained that even in the wake o f market turmoil, REITs have 
little or no influence on the greater stock market. Additionally, we find that spillovers 
from REITs to the stock market were not limited to securitized REITs -  we found the 
same result in estimated transaction-based REIT indices. Returns derived from the 
underlying value o f real estate have been found to have low correlation with stocks and 
be more comparable to physical real estate investments, so this finding is more surprising 
(Ling and Naranjo (1999)). Finally, the results from our study suggest that while REITs 
have historically been a good tool for diversification, they should be seen as only one 
component o f an overall diversification strategy. REITs may not always provide 
adequate diversification for every portfolio. When there are ties between a stock market 
downturn and real estate, an investor may find that aggregate REIT indices do not offer
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as much diversification protection as with an unrelated market decline. However, some o f 
the regional/property type investments still offered diversification benefits after the crisis, 
suggesting that it is possible to use REITs to protect a portfolio even with a real estate- 
related market crash.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Although much of the research o f market integration involves the linkages with 
and among foreign markets, many studies document the relationship between stock 
market returns and real estate returns (Gvourko and Keim (1992), Ling and Naranjo 
(1999), Clayton and MacKinnon (2003), and Peng and Schulz (Forthcoming)). The 
literature examining the level o f integration between the real estate and stock markets 
primarily seeks to assess the efficacy o f real estate as a diversifying investment for 
financial portfolios. Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1990) find that real estate can augment a 
portfolio by making the portfolio less sensitive to market swings. Real estate may have a 
smoothing effect on portfolio returns that some investors find desirable. In contrast, Liow 
and Yang (2005) find that in Asia, the linkages between securitized real estate and the 
stock market are so strong that using securitized real estate is ineffective for 
diversification. The conflicting results may be caused by the differing time periods. Ling 
and Naranjo (1999) and Clayton and MacKinnon (2001) find that over time, this 
relationship changes. The level o f integration o f the stock market and the real estate 
market is not static. One reason for the change in integration level over time may be that 
investors view real estate as a substitute investment for stocks. Several studies suggest 
that during times o f stock market uncertainty, investors shift funds from the stock market
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as a whole to real estate investments. (Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005), and 
Subrahmanyam (2007)).
A number o f other studies look at the performance o f  REITs relative to the stock 
market in times o f crisis. Glascock, Michayluk and Neuhauser (2004) examine the 
performance of REITs and non-REITs following the 1997 stock market crash. They find 
that REITs are good defensive stocks because REIT returns fell less than returns o f non- 
REIT stocks after the market fell. However, it may be a mistake to assume their results 
are applicable to the most recent market decline. The 1997 crash was much different from 
the 2008 financial crisis. Due to their reliance on leverage, REITs may have been hit 
particularly hard by the crisis (Horrigan, Case. Geltner and Pollakowski (2009)), which 
may impact the flow of funds from the stock market to real estate securities.
Simon and Ng (2009) also analyze the level o f integration between the stock 
market and REITs during the 2007 downturn. They find increased correlations between 
the S&P 500 and REITs. Their mixed-copula analysis also concludes that levels o f tail 
dependencies increased. However, since the tail dependence coefficients are lower than 
those reported for foreign stocks, the authors conclude that REITs remain more suitable 
for protection from severe market declines than foreign stocks. Our study takes an 
approach similar to the Subrahmanyam (2007) analysis o f return integration and differs 
from Simon and Ng (2009) in several important ways. First, we employ vector 
autoregressive (VAR) and state space models to examine the lead-lag relationships 
between the stock market and REITs, rather than the mixed-copula approach, since our 
focus is on the co-movement o f  returns. Second, our study covers a longer time period, 
including over two years o f data following the collapse o f Lehman Brothers. Finally, we
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investigate the integration o f the geographic/property type indices in addition to MREITs 
and EREITs.
DATA
To examine the level o f integration between the stock market and the real estate 
market, we use several proxies. We utilize the CRSP Value-Weighted index (CRSPVW) 
to represent the entire stock market. The FTSE/NAREIT indices are used for the 
securitized mortgage REITs (MREITs) and equity REITs (EREITs). CRSPVW was 
collected from the CRSP database, and the REIT indices (MREITs and EREITs) were 
collected from the Global Financial Database. In addition to the market proxy and the 
securitized real estate indices, we also examine the integration levels between the stock 
market and the real estate market by analyzing the FTSE/NAREIT PurePlay indices17. 
These daily indices report de-levered estimated returns by geographic area and property 
type. They are created by using regressions o f stock market price movements and detailed 
characteristics o f  the property holdings to determine the price movements in the 
underlying commercial property. This approach may offer a more timely assessment o f 
real estate property values than either transaction- or appraisal-based methods. Details 
about the formation o f the indices are available in Horrigan, Case, Geltner and 
Pollakowski (2009).
For this study, we use the following total return FTSE/NAREIT PurePlay indices: 
PUREP is the total return index for the U.S., including all property types. APTE, APTM, 
and APTS are apartment property type returns for east, midwest, and south regions,
17 We thank David Geltner, Brad Case and National Association o f  Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(NAREIT) for access to this dataset.
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respectively18. INDE, INDM. and 1NDSW are industrial property type returns for the 
east, midwest, and southwest regions. FTSE/NAREIT combined the south and west 
regions for this property type. Office property returns are reported for the midwest, south, 
and west regions by OFCM, OFCS, and OFCW, respectively. The retail property types 
are reported with RETM, RETS, and RETW for the midwest, south and west regions, 
respectively19.
Since the daily PurePlay indices have not been used in previous empirical studies, 
we next compare them to more established indices. The M oody’s/REAL commercial 
property index (CPPI) is the leading transaction-based REIT index20. Like the PurePlay 
indices, the CPPI is also available by region and property type. The CPPI includes all 
four property types covered by the PurePlay indices, but it only includes three regions: 
East, South, and West. Figures 3 through 6 display index values over time for 
corresponding property types and regions, where indices comparable to the sample 
PurePlay indices exist. The values o f  the CPPI indices are plotted quarterly and the 
PurePlay values are daily. To ensure comparability, the CPPI values were standardized to 
PurePlay data series start date by dividing all index values by their level as o f March 
2006.
18 The west region apartment index was omitted from this study due to it high correlation with CRSPVW , 
after conducting variance inflation factor (VIF) tests.
19 Similar to the apartment index for the w est region, the office and retail property' types for the east region 
were excluded from this study due to high VIFs.
20 The M oody’s/REAL CPPI data was retrieved from http://web.mit.edu/cre/research/credl/rca.htrnl.
100
Figure 3. FTSE NAREIT PurePlay and Moody’s/REAL CPPI Regional Apartment 
Sector Index Values
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Figure 4. FTSE NAREIT PurePlay and Moody’s/REAL CPPI Regional Industrial 
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The index comparison for the Apartment sector is reported in Figure 3. The East 
and South regions for both PurePlay and CPPI are included. The PurePlay Midwest 
region is omitted because a CPPI Midwest region does not exist. Prior to the 2008 crisis, 
the indices seem to agree in movement direction and timing. Both PurePlay and CPPI 
indices for the East Region have higher index values than those for the South region. 
However, the PurePlay indices start their recovery sooner than the CPPI indices. Both the 
East and South PurePlay indices start to increase in early 2009. The CPPI indices do not 
start to recover until nearly a year later. This may due to the securities market information 
discovery process. This finding is consistent with Horrigan, Case, Geltner and 
Pollakowski (2009) who argue that since market information is used to determine 
PurePlay index values, the PurePlay indices are expected to lead indices based on the 
private market.
The Industrial sector indices are reported in Figure 4. Note that the South and 
West regions are combined in the PurePlay indices, so there are only two PurePlay series, 
but three CPPI series for East, South, and West regions. As with the Apartment sector, 
the Industrial sector indices generally move together until the financial crisis. The 
PurePlay indices then begin their recovery well before the CPPI indices.
The Office and Retail sector indices are plotted in Figures 5 and 6, respectively. 
Once again, the PurePlay and CPPI track well with each other before the 2008 financial 
crisis. The Office sector, Figure 5, shows that even after the crisis, both sets o f  indices
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Figure 5. FTSE NAREIT PurePlay and Moody’s/REAL CPPI Regional Office 
Sector Index Values
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Figure 6. FTSE NAREIT PurePlay and Moody’s/REAL CPPI Regional Retail 
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agree. Although the PurePlay West region index increases throughout the sample period, 
the PurePlay West. CPPI South, and CPPI West region indices stay relatively flat. We see 
more o f a disagreement for the Retail sector in Figure 6. Both the South and West 
PurePlay regions show significant signs o f recovery, while the CPPI indices do not. 
However, Figures 3 through 6 show that overall, the PurePlay and CPPI indices are in 
general agreement, prior to the 2008 financial crisis, and the PurePlay indices lead the 
CPPI indices in the years following the crisis.
We conduct our analysis with daily continuously compounded returns (log 
returns) for 571 trading days before and 571 trading days after the delisting o f Lehman 
Brothers. The actual delisting date. September 17, 2008 was omitted. The pre-crisis 
period is June 12, 2006 through September 16, 2008. The during-crisis period is 
September 18, 2008 through December 31, 2010.
Table 18 reports summary statistics for the study variables. CRSPVW daily 
returns increased in the during-crisis period from 0.00005 to 0.00024. MREIT, EREIT, 
and the aggregate PUREP returns also increased in the crisis period. However, more than 
half o f the regional property type pure play returns decreased in the during-crisis period, 
providing a preliminary finding that they may be less integrated with the stock market 
than MREITs or EREITs. The standard deviations o f  all returns increased after the crisis, 
demonstrating the increased market volatility after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
Correlations between CRSPVW and all real estate indices increased after the
Table 18. Descriptive Statistics of Returns
This table presents descriptive statistics for the daily log returns for stock market and real estate indices. CRSP Value-Weighted index (CRSPVW) represents the 
entire stock market. The FTSE/NAREIT indices represent securitized mortgage REITs (MREITs) and equity REITS (EREITs). Real estate FTSE/NAREIT 
PurePlay indices include: PUREP, the total estimated transaction commercial real estate return index for the U .S.including all property types. APTE, APTM, and 
APTS are apartment property type returns for east midwest, and south regions, respectively. INDE, INDM, and INDSW are industrial property type returns for 
the east, midwest, and southwest regions. FTSE/NAREIT combined the south and west regions for this property type. Office property type returns are reported 
for the midwest, south, and west regions by OFCM, OFCS, and OFCW, respectively. The retail property types are reported with RETM, RETS, and RETW for 
the midwest, south and west regions, respectively. The pre-crisis period is June 12, 2006, through September 16, 2008. The during-crisis period is September 18, 
2008, through December 31, 2010. There are 571 trading day observations each in the pre- and during-crisis periods.
Pre-2008 Crisis During-2008 Crisis
Variable Mean Sid Dev Minimum Maximum Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
CRSPVW 0.00005 0.01061 (0.04674) 0.03882 0.00024 0.02054 (0.09405) 0.10875
MREIT (0.00181) 0.02428 (0.19274) 0.13694 0.00028 0.02879 (0.14923) 0.21970
EREIT (0.00023) 0.01840 (0.09109) 0.08117 (0 .00010) 0.03985 (0.20588) 0 16366
PUREP 0.00016 0.00935 (0.04059) 0.04145 0.00019 0.01628 (0.07813) 0.05722
APTE h 0.00018 0.01136 (0.04923) 0.05433 0.00032 001792 (0.07413) 0.07524
INDE (0.00013) 0.01036 (0.05789) 0.05083 0.00030 0.01485 (0.05272) 0.05437
APTM 0.00053 0.00822 (0.04393) 0.03984 (0.00035) 0.01396 (0.09214) 0.05410
INDM (0.00018) 0.01669 (0.08338) 0.05530 (0.00164) 0.01949 (0.24078) 0.08892
OFCM (0.00029) 0.00936 (0.03206) 0.03716 0.00095 0.01441 (0.04990) 0.06358
RETM 0.00010 0.00772 (0.03174) 0.02632 0.00002 0.01403 (0.07512) 0.05393
APTS (0.00024) 0.00918 (0.03289) 0.04757 0.00045 0.01480 (0.06991) 0.08092
OFCS 0.00019 0.01431 (0.06791) 0.05917 (0.00032) 0.02519 (0.17145) 0.11116
RETS 0.00014 0.01102 (0.04596) 0.05249 0.00023 0.01727 (0.08031) 0.07855
INDSW 0.00018 0.01517 (0.06506) 0.06391 (0.00004) 0.02386 (0.09407) 0.08269
OFCW 0.00017 0.00692 (0.02767) 0.02516 0.00015 0.01342 (0.08051) 0.05932
RETW (0 .00000) 0.01273 (0.04705) 0.05796 (0.00026) 0.02222 (0.09471) 0.08331
Table 19. Pearson Correlations
This table presents Pearson correlations for the daily log returns for stock market and real estate indices. CRSP Value-Weighted index (CRSPVW ) represents the 
entire stock market. The FTSE/NAREIT indices represent securitized mortgage REITs (MREITs) and equity REITS (EREITs). Real estate FTSE/NAREIT 
PurePlay indices include: PUREP, the total estimated transaction commercial real estate return index for the U.S., including all property types. APTE, APTM, 
and APTS are apartment property type returns for east, midwest, and south regions, respectively. INDE, INDM, and INDSW are industrial property type returns 
for the east, midwest, and southwest regions. FTSE/NAREIT combined the south and west regions for this property type. Office property type returns are 
reported for the midwest, south, and west regions by OFCM, OFCS, and OFCW, respectively. The retail property types are reported with RETM, RETS, and 
RETW for the midwest, south and west regions, respectively. The pre-crisis period is June 12, 2006, through September 16, 2008. The during-crisis period is 
September 18, 2008, through December 31, 2010. There are 57! trading day observations each in the pre- and during-crisis periods. Correlations with a 5% level 
o f  significance are reported in bold.
Panel A
Pre-2008 Crisis
CRSPVW MREIT EREIT PUREP APTE INDE APTM INDM OFCM RETM APTS OFCS RETS INDSW OFCW
MREIT 0.659
EREIT 0.793 0.734
PUREP 0.778 0.696 0.989
APTE 0.662 0.580 0.874 0.891
INDE 0.334 0.331 0.397 0.391 0.304
APTM -0.082 -0.081 -0.149 -0.143 -0.205 -0.072
INDM 0.251 0.172 0.372 0.372 0.338 -0.189 -0.025
OFCM 0.175 0.173 0.159 0.157 0.163 0.141 -0.148 -0.351
RETM 0.713 0.613 0.827 0.836 0.731 0.387 -0.107 0.227 0.229
APTS 0.653 0.611 0.827 0.830 0.655 0.349 -0.259 0.290 0.179 0.727
OFCS 0.637 0.599 0.795 0.808 0.711 0.381 -0.014 0.254 -0.044 0.689 0.652
RETS 0.685 0.611 0.896 0.893 0.782 0.343 -0.111 0.380 0.064 0.668 0.720 0.740
INDSW 0.727 0.659 0.917 0.921 0.816 0.371 -0.159 0.196 0.179 0.782 0.760 0.739 0.804
OFCW 0.696 0.618 0.875 0.891 0.751 0.332 -0.122 0.314 0.170 0.753 0.735 0.679 0.767 0.814
RETW 0.589 0.571 0.827 0.820 0.725 0.293 -0.146 0.391 0.101 0.649 0.651 0.574 0.694 0.740 0.724
Panel B
During-2008 Crisis
CRSPVW MREIT EREIT PUREP APTE INDE APTM INDM OFCM RETM APTS OFCS RETS INDSW OFCW
MREIT 0.7S4
EREIT 0.839 0.855
PUREP 0.847 0.833 0.985
APTE 0.796 0.812 0.943 0.949
INDE 0.540 0.394 0.537 0.570 0.512
APTM -0.388 -0.525 -0.576 -0.544 -0.578 -0.222
INDM 0.073 0.022 0.015 0.040 0.010 -0.211 0.049
OFCM 0.359 0.293 0.356 0.365 0.334 0.325 -0.213 -0.323
RETM 0.760 0.687 0.856 0.872 0.823 0.577 -0.404 0.016 0.316
APTS 0.754 0.788 0.909 0.928 0.854 0.525 -0.566 0.040 0.358 0.805
OFCS 0.728 0.787 0.889 0.880 0.861 0.451 -0.491 0.079 0.150 0.777 0.827
RETS 0.759 0.770 0.896 0.911 0.868 0.507 -0.511 -0.012 0.364 0.729 0.844 0.765
INDSW 0.800 0.775 0.934 0.945 0.887 0.538 -0.478 -0.065 0.357 0.834 0.868 0.821 0.860
OFCW 0.815 0.770 0.931 0.950 0.878 0.569 -0.500 0.022 0.357 0.853 0.871 0.824 0.842 0.889
RETW 0.653 0.639 0.807 0.838 0.774 0.456 -0.412 0.125 0.304 0.716 0.765 0.668 0.719 0.784 0.805
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2008 crisis, except for the midwest industrial property type21. The increased correlations 
in most returns, reported in Table 2, agree with the Simon and Ng (2009) finding o f 
higher correlations between the returns o f  the S&P500 and REITs after the 2007 
downturn.
A more visual examination of the relationship between stock market and REIT 
returns is presented in Figure 7. We chart the 30-day moving average log return for both 
CRSPVW and EREIT to examine the comovement over time. Although the two series 
clearly move together, it appears that the stock market returns tend to lead REIT returns. 
After the 2008 crisis, this trend reverses. The EREIT returns clearly lead CRSPVW 
returns for most o f the during-crisis period. This result provides additional preliminary 
evidence that real estate returns may influence stock market returns after the financial 
crisis.
METHODOLOGY/RESIJLTS
To study the level of integration between the real estate and stock markets, we 
employ three main empirical analyses. First, we examine Granger-causality tests to 
determine if the market returns are Granger-caused by the other sample market returns. 
Next, we perform vector autoregressions (VARs) to estimate the specific relationships 
between CRSPVW and the REIT indices. Finally, we utilize state space modeling to 
provide additional information about the linkages between stock market and real estate
21 The Midwest industrial index decreased from 0 .25! (statistically significant at the 5% level) to an 
insignificant 0.073.
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Figure 7. EREIT and CRSPVW Returns 30- Day Moving Average
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market returns. Each o f the three tests is performed on the pre-crisis and during-crisis 
samples so that we are able to examine any changes in the integration level before and 
after the delisting o f Lehman Brothers.
Granger-causality and vector autoregession (VAR)
Like Subrahmanyam (2007), we employ vector autoregression (VAR) and 
Granger-causality to test the level o f integration among MREITs, EREITs, and the stock 
market because we are interested in market co-movement. Prior to running either test, we 
perform Dickey-Fuller unit root tests and confirm that all returns are stationary. Table 20 
reports the results o f the Granger-causality tests. Chi-square statistics and p-values show 
the probability o f rejecting the null hypothesis that the Group 1 variable is not Granger- 
caused by the other variables. Due to the high level o f correlation between EREIT and 
PUREP, the tests are completed in separate panels. Panel A tests relationships between 
CRSPVW, MREIT, and EREIT, while Panel B tests CRSPVW and PUREP.
We find that prior to the 2008 crisis, the tests fail to reject the hypothesis that 
CRSPVW is not Granger-caused by MREIT and EREIT in Panel A and PUREP in Panel 
B. We interpret this finding as a lack o f evidence o f market integration. After the crisis, 
the tests show that the stock market returns are Granger-caused by MREITs, EREITs, and 
PUREP, significant at the 1% level. The Granger-causality tests support the hypothesis of 
increased integration of real estate and stock markets after the 2008 crisis.
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Table 20. Granger-causality Tests
This table reports the results o f  Granger-causality tests for daily log returns for stock market and real estate 
indices. CRSP Value-W eighted index (CRSPVW ) represents the entire stock market. The FTSE/NAREIT  
indices represent securitized mortgage REITs (M REITs) and equity REITS (EREITs). Real estate 
FTSE/NAREIT PurePlay index, PUREP, is the total estimated transaction commercial real estate return 
index for the U.S., including all property types. The pre-crisis period is June 12, 2006, through September 
16, 2008. The during-crisis period is September 18, 2008, through December 31, 2010. There are 571 
trading day observations each in the pre- and during-crisis periods.
Panel A
G ranger-Causality W ald Test
Group I 
Variable
Pre-2008 Crisis D uring-2008 Crisis
Chi-
Square °r > ChiSq
Chi-
Square Pr >  ChiSq
CRSPVW 1.91 0.3854 20.34 0.0024
MREIT 6.46 0.0395 26.35 0.0002
EREIT 4.11 0.1279 16.23 0.0126
Panel B
G ranger-Causality W ald Test
Pre-2008 Crisis D uring-2008 Crisis
Group 1 
Variable
Chi-
Square P r > ChiSq
Chi-
Square Pr > ChiSq
CRSPVW 4.36 0.2256 20.45 0.0001
PUREP 14.88 0.0019 15.91 0.0012
I l l
Table 21. Vector Autoregressions (VAR)
This table reports the results o f  vector autoregressions (VA R ) using daily log returns for stock market and 
real estate indices. CRSP Value-W eighted index (CRSPVW ) represents the entire stock market. The 
FTSE/NAREIT indices represent securitized mortgage REITs (MREITs) and equity REITS (EREITs). Real 
estate FTSE/NAREIT PurePlay index, PUREP, is the total estimated transaction com m ercial real estate 
return index for the U.S., including all property types. The pre-crisis period is June 12, 2006, through 
September 16, 2008. The during-crisis period is September 18, 2008, through December 3 1 ,2 0 1 0 . There 
are 571 trading day observations each in the pre- and during-crisis periods. ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. T-values are in parentheses.
Panel A
Pre-2008 crisis D uring-2008 crisis
CRSPVW MREIT EREIT CRSPVW MREIT EREIT
Constant 0.00005 -0.00170 -0.00031 0.00019 -0.00001 -0 .00026
(0 . 12) (-1.67) (-0.40) (0 .22) (-0 .01 ) (-0 .17)
CR SPV W (t-l) -0.17101* -0.36531* -0.16497 -0.09816 0.10059 0.04981
(-2.46) (-2.28) (-1 .37) (-1.18) (0.93) (0 .32)
M REIT(t-l) -0.02773 0.03205 -0.05778 0.03593 -0.07500 0.00838
( - 1.02) (0 .51) ( - 1.22) (0 .56) (-0 .90) (0 .07)
EREIT(t-l) 0.05837 0.05169 -0.00603 0.00188 -0.18964** -0.28641**
(1.30) (0.50) (-0 .08) (0.04) (-2 .81) (-2 .89)
CRSPVW(t-2) -0.24344** -0.16191 -0.25790
(-2.96) (-1 .52) (-1.65)
MRElT(t-2) -0 .06810 -0.15876 -0.21731
(-1.06) (-1 .90) (-1 .77)
EREIT(t-2) 0.14402** 0.12202 0.16634
(2.70) (1 7 6 ) (1.64)
CRSPVW(t-3) 0.30141** 0.33778** 0.40539**
(3.93) (3.39) (2 .78)
MREIT(t-3) -0.08084 -0.15531* -0.09893
(-1.41) (-2 .08) (-0 .91)
EREIT(t-3) -0.05914 -0.04831 -0.10111
(-1.17) (-0.73) (-1 .05)
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Panel B
Pre-2008 Crisis D uring-2008 Crisis
CRSPVW PUREP CRSPVW PUREP
Constant 0.00009 0.00021 0.00083 0.00065
(0 .21 ) (0 .54) (0.18) (0.28)
CR SPV W (t-l) -0 .21210** -0.12682* 0.08127 0.06348
(-3.18) (-2 .17) (-1.46) (-0 .36)
P U R E P (t-l) 0.09849 -0.01659 0.10435 0.08151*
(1.30) (-0 .25) (0.90) (-2 .34)
CRSPVW(t-2) -0.07499 -0.06386 0.08073** 0.06306*
( - 1. 11) (-1 .08) (-3.44) (-2 .29)
PUREP (1-2} 0.02920 -0.03174 0.10720** 0.08374
(0.38) (-0.48) (2.78) (1.44)
CRSPVW(t-3) -0.11526 -0.18762** 0.07762** 0.06063**
(-1.72) (-3.20) (3.97) (2.98)
PUREP/t-3) 0.12885 0.15610* 0.10024** 0.07830*
(1.70) (2 .34) (-2.73)...................... (-2 .04)
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Next, we examine the VAR model estimation in Table 21. The number o f lags 
used in each model was determined by electing the smallest Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC). Panel A once again reports results from models with CRSPVW, MREIT, and 
EREIT as dependent variables. CRSPVW and PUREP are the dependent variables in 
Panel B. The pre-crisis model is VAR(1) and the during-crisis model was determined to 
be VAR(3). Looking at the pre-crisis period, we find that MREIT and EREIT lags do not 
influence stock market returns. Only one o f the lagged values of itself influences 
CRSPVW. The market returns (CRSPVW) do influence MREIT, significant at the 5% 
level. EREIT is not influenced by either CRSPVW or MREIT. During-2008 crisis, the 
links between stock market returns and real estate returns increase. EREIT influences 
CRSPVW with a 2-day lag. significant at the 1% level. EREIT also influences MREIT 
with a 1-day lag, significant at the 1% level. Finally, CRSPVW influences MREIT and 
EREIT with a 3-day lag, again significant at the 1% level.
In Panel B, we examine the relationship between stock market returns and the 
aggregate pure play return index, PUREP. As in Panel A, the only significant predictor of 
CRSPVW in the pre-crisis time period is one lag o f itself, significant at the 1% level. In 
the during-crisis period, 2 and 3 lags o f PUREP influence CRSPVW at the 1% level. 
These results provide additional evidence o f increases in the linkages between the stock 
and real estate markets.
State space models
We next examine the data using state space models (Akaike (1976)), which are 
useful in analyzing the relationships among stationary time series data. The state space
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models incorporate variables and autocorrelations that are helpful in predicting future 
variables, but omit those that are not significantly explanatory, often resulting in a 
parsimonious model. Because the model considers all autocorrelations jointly, it may also 
result in more accurate estimates than models like VAR which estimate each dependent 
variable separately (Aoki and Havenner (1989)). The significant variables and 
autocorrelations are called the state vector, which is selected using the VAR model with 
the lowest AIC and then performing canonical correlation analysis to determine which 
variables are explanatory and hence belong in the state vector. After the state vector is 
identified, the transition matrix that maps the state space vector to its forecast is estimated 
using approximate maximum likelihood and a Kalman filter recursive algorithm. See 
Harvey and Peters (1990) for a detailed description o f state space models.
Panel A shows the results o f the state space model for CRSPVW, MREIT, and 
EREIT. In the pre-crisis period, the stock market returns (CRSPVW) are only 
significantly influenced by 1 lag o f itself. MREIT is also influenced by 1 lag o f 
CRSPVW, significant at the 5% level. There is no relationship between EREIT and 
CRSPVW or MREIT in the pre-crisis period. In the during-2008 crisis period, the stock 
market returns are influenced by EREIT at 1- and 2-day lags, significant at the 1% level. 
There is a contemporaneous relationship between CRSPVW and MREIT, suggesting that 
the stock market and the real estate market may move together. 1-day lags o f  CRSPVW 
and EREIT are also significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. EREIT is strongly 
(1% level) influenced by CRSPVW for 1- and 2-day lags, whereas there was no 
relationship before the crisis.
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Table 22. State Space Models
This table reports the results o f  state space m odels using daily log returns for stock market and real estate 
indices. CRSP Value-W eighted index (CRSPVW ) represents the entire stock market. The FTSE/NAREIT  
indices represent securitized mortgage REITs (M REITs) and equity REITS (EREITs). Real estate 
FTSE/NAREIT PurePlay index, PUREP, is the total estimated transaction commercial real estate return 
index for the U.S., including all property types. The pre-crisis period is June 12, 2006, through September 
16, 2008. The during-crisis period is September 18, 2008, through Decem ber 31, 2010. There are 571 
trading day observations each in the pre- and during-crisis periods. ** and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. T-values are in parentheses.
Panel A
P re-2008 Crisis D uring-2008 Crisis
CRSPVW MREIT EREIT CRSPVW MREIT EREIT
CRSPVW(t) 1.19665**
(7.87)
CR SPV W (t-l) -0.17087* -0.36601* -0.16679 -1.48056** 0.15540* -0.92841**
(-2.52) (-2.35) (-1.43) (-7.35) (2.23) (-2.62)
M R ElT(t-l) -0.02767 0.03175 -0.05859 -0.13074*
(-1.03) (0.52) (-1.26) (-2 .56)
EREIT(t-J) 0.05814 0.05280 -0.00310 0.51391** -0.14967** -0.28556
(1.34) (0.53) (-0.04) (4.09) (-3 .53) (-1.41)
CRSPVW(t-2) -0.39507**
(-5.59)
-0.52469**
(-4.56)
MRElT(t-2) -0 .01949
(-0.40)
-0.09271
( - 1.21)
ERElT(t-2) 0.24146**
(4.97)
0.18248*
(2.40)
P anelB
P re-2008 Crisis D uring-2008 Crisis
CRSPVW PUREP CRSPVW PUREP
CRSPVW(t) 0.57347**
(6.99)
CRSPVW (t-I) -0.20451** -0.57722** 0 01909
(-3.11) (-3.96) (0.55)
PU REP(t-I) 0.10404 0.20765 -0.21315**
(1.40) (0 .86) (-5 .11)
CRSPVW(t-2) -0.41114**
(-5.41)
PUREP/i-2) 0.56081*
(2.38)
0.36758**
(4.29)
CRSPVW fi-3) -0.02594
(-0.42)
PUREP(l-3) 0.05629
( 1. 11)
L _ _ _ _ _ _
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Panel B results are very similar to Panel A. CRSPVW and PUREP are not related 
prior to the crisis. However, after the delisting o f Lehman Brothers, 2 lags o f  PUREP 
influence CRSPVW at the 1% level, and PUREP is contemporaneously related to 
CRSPVW. The state space results support and confirm the VAR results that the linkages 
between the stock market and real estate market have increased. Taken together, Tables 
22 and 23 provide strong evidence that the stock market and real estate market have 
become more integrated since the 2008 crisis.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
We now perform several analyses to ensure that our results are robust to 
alternative specifications. First, we examine an alternate definition o f the start o f the 
crisis. We then examine additional pure play indices to see if  geographic and property 
type indices have different results from the aggregate returns used in our main analysis. 
Finally, we utilize an alternate market proxy, the Russell 2000 small cap index.
Beginning date o f  the financial crisis
Simon and Ng (2009) investigate the level o f integration between the stock 
market and real estate surrounding the real estate market downturn. To ensure our results 
are not sensitive to the crisis date, we repeat our analyses using their January 31, 2007, 
downturn date. In accordance with the previous analysis, we use 571 trading day 
observations before and after the downturn, resulting in a pre-downturn period from 
October 22, 2004, to January 31, 2007, and a during-downtum period o f February 1,
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Table 23. Granger-causality Tests and Vector Autoregressions (Pre- and During- 
2007 Downturn)
This table reports the results o f  Granger-causality tests and vector autoregressions using daily log returns 
for stock market and real estate indices. CRSP Value-W eighted index (CRSPVW ) represents the entire 
stock market. The FTSE/NAREIT indices represent securitized mortgage REITs (M REITs) and equity 
REITS (ERElTs). Real estate FTSE/NAREIT PurePlay index, PUREP, is the total estimated transaction 
commercial real estate return index for the U.S., including all property types. The pre-downturn period is 
from October 22, 2004, to January 31, 2007, and the during-downtum period is from February 1, 2007 to 
May 8, 2009. There are 571 trading day observations each in the pre- and during-crisis periods. ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. T-values are in parentheses.
Panel A
G ranger-C ausality W ald Test
Group I Variable
Pre-2007 Downturn During-2007 Downturn
Chi-Square P r > ChiSq Chi-Square P r  > ChiSq
CRSPVW 0.02 0.9901 20.62 0.0021
MREIT 1.08 0.5813 19.25 0.0038
EREIT 0.84 0.6578 13.91 0.0307
Panel B
Pre-2007 Downturn D uring-2007 Downturn
CRSPVW MREIT EREIT CRSPVW MREIT EREIT
Constant 0.00061* -0.00021 0.00068 -0.00067 -0.0027 -0.00249
(2.18) (-0.45) (1.70) (-0 .79) (-1 .82) (-1.53)
CRSPVW (t-I) 0.0091 0.03843 0.07413 -0.25783** -0.19122 -0.19169
(0.15) (0.37) (0.84) (-3 .20) (-1.36) (-1.24)
MREIT(t-I) -0 .00277 0.11508 0.00006 0.02247 -0.01799 0.02322
(-0 .06) (1.56) (0 .00) (0 .56) (-0 .26) (0.30)
EREIT(t-1) 0.00677 -0.08522 0.05762 0.06682 -0.10721 -0.21507*
(0.14) (-1.04) (0.82) d -4 3 ) (-1 .31) (-2.38)
CRSPVW(t-2) -0.31599** -0.30585* -0.40194*
(-3 .90) (-2.16) (-2.58)
MREIT(t-2) -0 .01686 -0.05743 -0.06401
(-0 .42) (-0 .82) (-0.83)
EREITU-2) 0.15649** 0.15763 0.13177
(3.25) (1.87) (1.42)
CRSPVW  it-3) 0.23131** 0.20853 0.2332
(2.99) (1-54) (1-57)
M REIT(t-i) -0.0473 -0.10794 -0.06683
(-1 1 9 ) (-1 .55) (-0 .87)
ERElT(t-3) -0.02876 -0.01789 -0.04302
(-0.62) (-0 .22 ) (-0 .48)
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2007 to May 8, 2009. Since the estimated transactional (pure play) daily data are not 
available until March 2006, we conduct this test only on MREITs and EREITs.
Granger-causality tests, reported in Panel A of Table 23, confirm our previous 
results. Prior to the 2007 downturn, CRSPVW is not Granger-caused by either EREIT or 
MREIT. In fact. EREIT and MREIT are not Granger-caused by CRSPVW either. The 
VAR results in Panel B echo those from Granger-causality. Before the 2007 real estate 
downturn, there are no significant market linkages between the stock market and the real 
estate market. During-downturn, CRSPVW is influenced by EREIT with a 2-day lag, in 
addition to lags o f itself, significant at the 1% level. MREIT and EREIT are both 
influenced by CRSPVW with a 2-day lag at a 5% level o f significance.
In both Granger-causality and VAR, using an earlier downturn date shows less 
market integration prior to the 2007 downturn. However, both methods show that the 
stock market and real estate market are significantly linked after the downturn. The 
results demonstrate that our previous analyses are not sensitive to the definition o f the 
start o f the crisis/downturn and provide strong evidence that the real estate market and 
stock market are more integrated since the recent financial market turmoil.
Geographic/property type variation
Our analysis with stock market integration used an aggregate estimated 
transaction-based index (PUREP) as a proxy for commercial real estate returns. We 
found that PUREP did influence CRSPVW and that integration between the real estate 
market and the stock market increased following the collapse o f Lehman Brothers. We
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Table 24. Granger-causality Tests by Geographic/Property Type
This table presents Granger-causality tests for the daily log returns for stock market and real estate indices. 
CRSP Value-W eighted index (CRSPVW ) represents the entire stock market. Real estate FTSE/NAREIT  
PurePlay indices include are estimated transaction commercial real estate return index for the U.S. APTE, 
APTM, and APTS are apartment property returns for east, midwest, and south regions, respectively. INDE, 
IN DM, and INDSW  are industrial property returns for the east, midwest, and southwest regions. 
FTSE/NAREIT combined the south and west regions for this property type. O ffice property returns are 
reported for the midwest, south, and west regions by OFCM, OFCS, and OFCW, respectively. The retail 
property types are reported with RETM, RETS, and RETW for the m idwest, south and west regions, 
respectively. The pre-crisis period is June 12, 2006 through September 16, 2008. The during-crisis period is 
September 18, 2008 through December 31, 2010. There are 571 trading day observations each in the pre- 
and during-crisis periods.
G ranger-C  ausality W ald Test
Group I Variable
Pre-2008 Crisis D uring-2008 Crisis
Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq Chi-Square P r > ChiSq
CRSPVW 10.84 0.5429 199.57 <.0001
APTE 35.34 0.0004 197.52 <.0001
INDE 19.22 0.0834 108.20 0.0001
APTM 8.48 0.7465 174.45 <.0001
INDM 17.77 0.1228 123.39 <0001
OFCM 10.68 0.5566 166.77 <0001
RETM 15.48 0.2161 204.15 <.0001
APTS 12.96 0.3719 190.36 <.0001
OFCS 27.92 0.0057 193.79 <.0001
RETS 16.07 0.1879 172.75 <.0001
INDSW 21.11 0.0489 183.12 <0001
OFCW 11.47 0.4889 175.00 <0001
RETW 1 1.45 0.4905 124.20 <.0001
120
now explore that result to see if the increased integration is stronger or weaker in certain 
geographic/property type sectors.
Table 24 shows results from Granger-causality tests. The p-value reports the 
probability o f rejecting the null hypothesis that the Group 1 variable is not Granger- 
caused by the remaining variables. In the pre-crisis period, the test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis for CRSPVW with a p-value o f 0.543. Three o f the four geographic/property 
type segments are Granger-caused by the other variables (APTE, OFCS, and INDSW), 
but most show evidence o f the same level o f independence as CRSPVW. After the 2008 
crisis, all markets are Granger-caused (1% significance) by the others indicating another 
striking increase in integration.
Table 25 provides the results o f VAR analyses o f the relationship between the 
geographic/property type segments and the stock market. Panel A shows the results for 
before the 2008 crisis from a V A R(l) model. CRSPVW is influenced by its own lagged 
value, significant at the 5% level. Real estate returns exhibit varying levels o f  integration 
with each other, but a weak relationship with the stock market as a whole. The during- 
crisis model is VAR(5) and is reported in Panel B. For the sake of brevity, we only report 
during-2008 crisis significant (5% level) influences o f the stock market returns. Once 
again, we confirm the finding that market integration has increased since the 2008 crisis. 
Almost all o f the real estate geographic/property type returns now influence stock market 
returns, whereas prior to the crisis, none o f them did.
Table 25. Vector autoregressions (VAR) by Geographic/Property Type
This table presents vector autoregression (VAR) results for the daily log returns for stock market and real estate indices. CRSP Value-Weighted index 
(CRSPVW) represents the entire stock market. Real estate FTSE/NAREIT PurePlay indices include estimated transaction commercial real estate return index for 
the U.S. APTE, APTM, and APTS are apartment property returns for east, midwest, and south regions, respectively. INDE, INDM, and INDSW are industrial 
property returns for the east, midwest, and southwest regions. FTSE/NAREIT combined the south and west regions for this property type. Office property returns 
are reported for the midwest, south, and west regions by OFCM, OFCS, and OFCW, respectively. The retail property types are reported with RETM, RETS, and 
RETW for the midwest, south and west regions, respectively. The pre-crisis period is June 12, 2006, through September 16, 2008. The during-crisis period is 
September 18, 2008, through December 31, 2010. Due to space considerations. Panel B only reports significant estimates for the CRSPVW model. There are 571 
trading day observations each in the pre- and during-crisis periods. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. T-values are in 
parentheses.
Panel A
Pre-2008 Crisis
CRSPVW APTE INDE APTM INDM OFCM RETM APTS OFCS RETS INDSW OFCW RETW
Constant 0.00005 0.00014 -0.00024 0.00057 -0.00004 -0.00026 0.00010 -0.00025 0.00007 0.00008 0.00012 0.00013 -0.00001
(0 12) (0.29) (-0.54) (1.65) (-0.06) (-0.67) (0.30) (-0.65) (0.11) (0.17) (0.18) (0.44) (-0.02)
CRSPVW(t-l) -0.14739* -0.09528 -0.07052 -0.00268 0.06294 -0.07055 -0.06335 -0.06421 -0.15979 -0.15782* -0.18550 -0.02086 -0.00215
(-2.19) (-1.34) (-1.07) (-0.05) (0.59) (-1.18) (-1.30) (-1 09) (-181) (-2.26) (-1.94) (-0.47) (-0.03)
APTE(t-l) 0.13928 0.28761** 0.18237* -0.03707 -0 02684 0.15926* 0.15633** 0.18302* 0.28523** 0.14038 0.21181 0.08259 0.15682
(1-69) (3.30) (2.26) (-0.57) (-0.21) (2.17) (2.62) (2.55) (263) (1.64) (1.81) (1.53) (1.57)
INDEtt-1) -0.03249 -0.09022 0.02562 0.04170 0.04948 0 02551 0.00765 -0.03416 -0.00255 -0.05061 -0.07780 -0.02293 -0.03436
(-0.62) (-1.64) (0.50) (1.02) (0.60) (0.55) (0.20) (-0.75) (-0.04) (-0.94) (-1.05) (-0.67) (-0.54)
APTM (l-l) 0.00445 0.04617 0.06848 -0.06560 -0.09553 0.04530 0.01156 0.01691 0.03584 0.03435 0.01754 0.03479 -0.01156
(0.08) (0.74) (1.18) (-1.42) (-1.02) (0.86) (0.27) (0.33) (0.46) (0.56) (0.21) (0.90) (-0.16)
lNDM(t-1) 0.00622 -0.08474* -0.02415 0.01560 0.11920* 0.03351 -0.01670 -0.04325 -0.10162* -0.05892 -0.06217 -0.02819 0.00549
(0.16) (-2.10) (-0.65) (0.52) (1.98) (0.99) (-0.61) (-1.30) (-2.03) (-1.49) (-1.15) (-1.13) (0.12)
OFCM(t-l) 0.03325 -0.07364 -0.03329 0.02276 0.00018 -0.00746 -0.02416 -0.05753 -0.16087* -0.05443 -0.10485 -0.04425 -0.06784
(0.57) (-1.19) (-0.58) (0.49) (0.00) (-0.14) (-0.57) (-1.12) (-2.08) (-0.89) (-1.26) (-1.15) (-0.95)
RETM(t-l) -0.05639 0.01146 -0.00324 0.07463 0.14568 -0.10069
(-0.51) (0. 10) (-0.03) (0.86) (0.84) (-1.03)
APTS(t-l) -0.12102 0.06553 -0.11925 0.00902 0.00362 0.06038
(-1.36) (0.70) (-1.37) (0.13) (0.03) (0.76)
OFCS(t-I) 0.02816 -0.07843 0.03670 0.03796 -0.12615 0.03937
(0.50) (-1.32) (0.67) (0.86) (-1.42) (0.79)
RETS(t-l) -0.01486 -0.04863 -0.13380 -0.00320 -0.12806 -0.02627
(-0.17) (-0.54) (-1.61) (-0.05) (-0.96) (-0.35)
INDSWft-h 0.01604 -0.00050 -0.05826 -0.10858 0.32625** -0.02965
(0.22) (-0.01) (-0.80) (-1.88) (2.80) (-0.45)
OFCW(t-I) -0.12340 -0.26955* 0.12909 001728 -0,46078* -0.03974
(-0.96) (-1.99) (1.03) (0.17) (-2.28) (-0.35)
RETW (t-1) 0.05903 -0.04341 0.00399 0.02276 -0.04709 -0.05325
(0.99) (-0.69) (0.07) (0,49) (-0.50) (-1.01)
-0.08347
(-1.05)
-0.06510
( - 1 .0 1 )
0.00048
(0 .0 1 )
-0.00846
(-0.14)
-0.01260
(-0.24)
-0.13328
(-1.44)
0.01247
(0.29)
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0.06497 -0.04680
(0.68) (-0.32)
0.04766 -0.11647
(0.61) (-0.99)
0.06145 -0.13256
(-1.25) (-1 79)
0.00074 -0.00812
(0.01) (-0.07)
0.00243 ■0.07677
(-0.04) (-0.79)
0.17509 -0.06657
(-157) (-0.40)
0.01059 0.02714
(0.20) (0.35)
0.00768 0.08544
(0.07) (0.55)
-0.04255 -0.10046
(-0.46) (-0.79)
0.04441 -0.01891
(0.76) (-0.24)
-0.07770 -0.04626
(-0.88) (-0.38)
-0.01585 0.02651
(-0.21) (0.25)
-0.10927 -0.33767
(-0.82) (-1.86)
0.06454 0.04350
(104) (0.51)
-0.01252 0.00312
(-0.17) (0.02)
-0.05383 -0.07621
(-0.92) (-0.71)
-0.03754 -0.07779
(-1.02) (-1.14)
-0.02785 0.02551
(-0.50) (0.25)
0.04705 0.06511
(0.97) (0.73)
-0.12613 -0.27621
(-1.50) (-1.78)
0.03985 0.05782
(1 02) (0.80)
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Panel B
During-2008 Crisis 
(Significant estim ates for CRSPVW  only)
CRSPVW
lN D M (t-l) 0.16789**
(3.08)
O F C M (t-l) 0.15310*
(2 .01 )
RETW (t-i) -0.14773*
(-2 . 10)
CRSPVW(t-2) -0.23520**
(-2.82)
APTE(t-2) 0.39486**
(2.67)
lNDE(t-2) -0.15562*
(-2.07)
APTS(t-2) -0.43250**
(-2 .86 )
RETWO-2) 0.18721**
(2.59)
CRSPVW(t-3) 0.27783**
(3.26)
APTE(t-3) -0.30173*
(-2.05)
lNDE(t-3) 0.1Q636**
(2.64)
APTM (i-3) -0.21463**
(-2.61)
OFCM(t-4) 0.20574**
(2.79)
RETM(t-4) -0.54044**
(-4.17)
OFCM(t-S) -0.22676**
(-3.14)
OFCS(t-S) -0.30989**
(-3.93)
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Unlike the analysis with MREIT. EREIT. and PUREP, there are a few exceptions 
to the high level o f integration seen after the financial crisis. Although the results are not 
shown, INDSW does not influence the stock market, even after the crisis. CRSPVW  does 
influence INDSW with lags o f  2 and 3 days. Similarly. APTS influences CRSPVW at 2 
lags, but the finding is not reciprocal. CRSPVW  does not influence APTS. These 
geographic/property type segments demonstrate lower levels of integration than the other 
indices. Having exposure to these new, more specific property types and regions o f real 
estate may allow an investor a better opportunity to diversify his portfolio than aggregate 
indices.
Market proxy index
Our main goal is to explore the relationship between the real estate market and the 
stock market as a whole. To that end. the majority o f  our study employs the CRSP value- 
weighted index as proxy for the stock market. However, previous literature suggests that 
REITs may perform more like small cap stocks than other securities (Glascock, Lu and 
So (2000)). Therefore, it is interesting to investigate whether the relationship between 
small cap stocks and the real estate market also changes after the financial crisis.
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Table 26. Granger-Causality Tests and Vector Autoregressions (Pre- And During- 
2008 Crisis)
This table reports the results o f  Granger-causality tests and vector autoregressions using daily log returns 
for stock market and real estate indices. Russell 2000 index (R ussell2000) represents the market o f  small 
cap stocks. The FTSE/NAREIT indices represent securitized mortgage REITs (M REITs) and equity REITS 
(EREITs). The pre-crisis period is June 12, 2006, through September 16, 2008. The during-crisis period is 
September 18, 2008, through December 31, 2010 .There are 571 trading day observations each in the pre- 
and during-crisis periods. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. T- 
values are in parentheses.
Panel A
G ranger-Causality W ald Test
Group 1 Variable
P re-2008 Crisis D uring-2008 Crisis
Chi-Square Pr >  ChiSq Chi-Square P r  > ChiSq
Russell2000 1.29 0.5259 7.86 0.0970
MREIT 2.74 0.2535 15.33 0.0041
EREIT 2.26 0.3224 13.90 0.0076
Panel B
P re-2008 Crisis D uring-2008 Crisis
Russell
2000
MREIT EREIT Russell
2000
MREIT EREIT
Constant 0.00001 -0.00175 -0.00035 0.00000 -0.00003 -0.00029
(0 .01) (-1.71) (-0.45) (0 .00) (-0 .03) (-0.18)
R ussell2000(t-l) -0.12053 -0.16151 -0.01840 0.03710 0.11684 0.17504
(-1.60) (-1.23) (-0.19) (0.42) (1 .24) (1.28)
M REIT(t-l) -0.03963 0.02277 -0.06755 0.03483 -0.07354 -0.00964
(-1.09) (0.36) (-1.42) (0.44) (-0 .89) (-0.08)
ER ElT(t-l) 0.04458 -0.00602 -0.06097 -0.10738 -0.21218** -0.35711**
(0.72) (-0.06) (-0.75) (-1-56) (-2 .92) (-3.38)
Russell2000(t-2) -0.19788*
(-2.31)
-0.16761
(-1 .85)
-0.29874*
(-2.26)
MRElT(t-2) -0.06519
(-0.93)
-0.18347*
(-2 .47)
-0.26348*
(-2.44)
ERElT(t-2) 0.13101*
(1.97)
0.14864*
(2 . 11)
0.22191*
(2.17)
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We employ the Russell 2000 small cap index (Russell2000) to represent the 
market o f small cap firms and perform Granger causality tests and VARs with 
Russell2000, MREIT and EREIT. Table 26 reports the results o f Granger causality tests 
in Panel A and VAR in Panel B. First examining the Granger causality tests in Panel A, 
we find that prior to the 2008 crisis there is no evidence that Russell2000, MREIT, or 
EREIT returns Granger cause the others. After the crisis, we find that MREIT and 
EREIT both Granger cause the group containing the other two variables. However, 
Russell2000 does not Granger cause the others. This result is not unexpected, given our 
previous finding that more focused real estate indices are less integrated with the market 
as a whole. Similarly, it appears that after the 2008 crisis, the Russell2000 is less 
integrated with the real estate market than is the CRSP value weighted index.
These results are confirmed in the VAR analysis in Panel B. In the Pre-2008 
crisis period, there are no statistically significant relationships among the real estate and 
small cap market returns. After the crisis. EREIT returns influence Russell2000 returns 
with a two-day lag, significant at the 5%  level. EREIT returns also influence MREIT 
returns with one- and two-day lags at 1% significance and 5% significance, respectively. 
EREIT returns are significantly related at the 5% level to 2-day lags o f  both Russell2000 
and MREIT returns. The results in Table 26 provide further evidence supporting the 
notion that the real estate and stock markets have become more integrated since the 2008 
financial crisis.
CONCLUSION
By examining the return linkages between the stock market and the real estate 
market, we investigate the effect the 2008 financial crisis had on the level o f  integration 
between these two markets. Although there is little evidence of integration prior to the 
crisis, we find strong levels o f integration following the de-listing o f Lehman Brothers. 
The results are robust to alternate methodologies (Granger-causality, VAR, state space) 
as well as alternate dates for the pre- and during- crisis periods and are consistent with 
recent findings o f increases in REITs' systematic risk following the financial crisis. 
However, we do find that some focused regional/property type indices were less 
integrated with the stock market than the aggregate return indices. These pure play 
indices may provide a level o f diversification, even when the stock market and real estate 
markets are integrated.
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